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A R T I C L E S

Correlative Rights
and Limited
Common Property
in the Pore Space:
A Response to the
Challenge of
Subsurface Trespass
in Carbon Capture
and Sequestration
by Tara K. Righetti
Tara K. Righetti is an Assistant Professor of Law and
Director of the academic program in Professional
Land Management at the University of Wyoming.

Summary
Carbon dioxide and other substances injected as part of
carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) have the potential to migrate beyond the confines of the injection project, creating the potential for trespass. In order for CCS
to be viable, legal clarity on the issue of subsurface trespass
is required. This Article argues that the challenge of subsurface trespass associated with CCS can be overcome by
conceptualizing pore space rights in the storage complex
as limited common property with rights of proportionate
use. The traditional oil and gas framework of correlative
rights can be a valuable model to promote investment,
encourage private ordering, and discourage the underutilization of subsurface property for CCS.
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T

he web of interests conveyed by property ownership becomes increasingly tangled as one ventures
deeper into the subsurface.1 An owner’s rights to
exclude others and to extract economic rent for use of the
property are chief among the tenets of private ownership,2
yet courts have been wary of extending an absolute right of
exclusion to subsurface invasions resulting from the transboundary migration of substances.3 Subsurface trespasses
resulting from climate mitigation technologies create a
perfect storm of problematic property law issues: fugacious
substances, questionable assertions of physical possession,
ambiguous damages resulting from anticipated injuries,
and compelling public purposes.4
Faced with these issues, courts have conflated the doctrines of trespass and nuisance through the application of
a “modern view” of trespass to subsurface intrusions.5 This
Author’s Note: This research was made possible through support from
the School of Energy Resources. Valuable comments were received
from Keith Hall and the faculty and students at Louisiana State
University (LSU) during the Bringing the Rockies to the Bayou
lecture, at which LSU was gracious enough to invite me to speak.
This research builds upon the excellent work of Profs. Alexandra
Klass and Elizabeth Wilson on the subject of carbon capture and
sequestration, and Profs. David Pierce, Owen Anderson, Bruce
Kramer, and Keith Hall on the subject of subsurface trespasses.
Any new insights presented here would not have been attainable
without the comprehensive foundations provided by their research.
Alex Ritchie, Sam Kalen, and Jason Robison all provided insightful
comments in the revision process. Casey Terrell (J.D./M.A. 2018)
provided excellent research assistance. I thank Chris Rynders and
ELR and its staff for their editorial assistance.
1.	
2.	
3.	

4.	

5.	

Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, The Reconstitution of Property: Property as a
Web of Interests, 26 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 281 (2002).
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435-46
(1982) (“The power to exclude has traditionally been considered one of the
most treasured strands in an owner’s bundle of property rights.”).
Owen L. Anderson, Subsurface “Trespass”: A Man’s Subsurface Is Not His
Castle, 49 Washburn L.J. 247, 248-49 (2010) [hereinafter Subsurface “Trespass”]; Owen L. Anderson, Geologic CO2 Sequestration: Who Owns the Pore
Space?, 9 Wyo. L. Rev. 97, 99 (2009) [hereinafter Geologic CO2]; Alexandra
B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Climate Change, Carbon Sequestration, and
Property Rights, 2010 U. Ill. L. Rev. 363, 365 (2010).
See, e.g., Joseph W. Bingham, The Nature and Importance of Legal Possession
I, 13 Mich. L. Rev. 7 (1915); Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of
Title, 13 Ga. L. Rev. 1221 (1979); Charles T. McCormick, Damages for
Anticipated Injury to Land, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 547 (1924).
Adams v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 602 N.W.2d 215, 220 (Mich. Ct. App.
1999):
The effects of recent trends in the law of trespass have included
eliminating the requirements of a direct invasion by a tangible object, requiring proof of actual and substantial damages, and weighing the plaintiff’s damages against the social utility of the operation
causing them. This so-called “modern view of trespass” appears,
with all its nuances and add-ons, merely to replicate traditional nuisance doctrine . . . . Indeed, the trends recognized or advanced by
Bradley, Borland, Martin, and their kindred spirits have conflated
nuisance with trespass to the point of rendering it difficult to delineate the difference between the two theories of recovery.
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amalgamation recognizes the permanent, physical occupation of the subsurface property as a trespass, yet requires a
difficult-to-achieve demonstration of harm or loss of use in
order to justify a damage award.6 Further, though courts
have preserved the option, injunctive relief is rarely granted.7 Thus, subsurface trespasses resulting from migration
of injected substances are rarely actionable in a way that
provides meaningful relief. As a result, the ability to remedy violations of the right of exclusion in the subsurface has
become increasingly tenuous.
An examination of the difficulties presented by subsurface trespasses suggests the need for an evolving conceptualization of subsurface property. Non-mineral subsurface
reservoirs hold enormous potential for addressing some of
the challenges of climate change through carbon capture
and sequestration (CCS).8 The difficulty of exalting both
rights of exclusion and rights of use in the subsurface pore
space—particularly in the non-hydrocarbon pore space—
is that the most evident uses of pore space are intrinsically
resistant to confinement within a specific column of space.9
Reservoirs operate holistically, without regard to property
or geopolitical boundaries.10 While geologists may be able
to predict the path of a plume, or to steer it, over time,
the reservoir will seek to diffuse any injected material and
stabilize pressure.11

6.	
7.	

8.	

9.	
10.

11.

There is also some confusion about whether the doctrines of nuisance
or strict liability should apply. See Bruce M. Kramer, Horizontal Drilling
and Trespass: A Challenge to the Norms of Property and Tort Law, 25 Colo.
Nat. Resources, Energy & Envtl. L. Rev. 291, 313-14 (2014) (“The
wild card in this analysis [of whether hydraulic fracturing results in an
actionable trespass] is whether or not a jurisdiction will apply the strict or
absolute liability standard of Rylands v. Fletcher.”). Although the challenge of
demonstrating damage would still apply, whether a strict liability standard
could apply to migration of carbon dioxide (CO2) outside a carbon capture
and sequestration (CCS) storage reservoir is beyond the scope of this Article.
Anderson, Subsurface “Trespass,” supra note 3, at 207.
Id. at 207, arguing for a restrained use of injunction (“In circumstances
where a landowner or mineral owner suffers actual and substantial subsurface
damages, courts should generally limit relief to money damages and deny
injunctive relief or ejectment.”); Kramer, supra note 5, at 302 (citing Gregg
v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 344 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. 1961); Deli-Taylor Oil
Corp. v. Holmes, 344 S.W.2d 411, 416 (Tex. 1961)).
Klass & Wilson, supra note 3, at 372 (“CCS is emerging as a potentially
promising but potentially contentious technology that could enable the
continued use of fossil fuels while still allowing society to dramatically
reduce accompanying [greenhouse gas] emissions.”); Int’l Energy Agency,
Carbon Capture and Storage: Legal and Regulatory Review 4
(2014).
Id. at 381 (“[t]here is the real potential for CCS operations to interfere
with actual or reasonably foreseeable uses of subsurface pore space and,
consequently, subsurface property rights”).
James Robert Zadick, The Public Pore Space: Enabling Carbon Capture and
Sequestration by Reconceptualizing Subsurface Property Rights, 36 Wm. &
Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 257, 260 (2011) (citing Nat’l Energy Tech.
Lab., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 2010 Carbon Sequestration Atlas of the
United States and Canada 23-33 (3d ed. 2010)).
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Technical Support Document,
Vulnerability Evaluation Framework for Geologic Sequestration
of Carbon Dioxide 53 (2008) (EPA430-R-08-009), available at https://

5-2017

This in turn suggests that the business of parsing molecules in order to uphold an absolute right of exclusion
is unwise, and could create an insurmountable obstacle
to carbon capture projects. Injectors will be unwilling to
make the significant investments required for carbon storage as long as there exists the potential for injunctive relief
or ejectment.12 Accordingly, property owners will paradoxically be neither able to make full use of their property
for carbon storage nor to fully preclude intrusions by others, thus deterring innovation and investment.13 Therefore,
responding to what Prof. David E. Pierce refers to as “the
modern property analysis imperative,” concepts of property in the non-mineral subsurface should be adapted to
reflect characteristics inherent to the property’s use.14
This Article argues that in order to facilitate the significant public good of carbon capture projects, pore space
rights in the deep subsurface should be conceptualized
based on the acknowledgment that “compartmentalized
ownership of the reservoir is impossible.”15 Doing so permits consideration of deep subsurface pore space ownership as something akin to what Prof. Carol Rose refers to
as “limited common property.”16 This concept would create
a legal privilege granting each owner within the reservoir
community a right of proportionate use.17 Accordingly,
rather than treating ownership as exclusive, the rights
of each owner within the private interconnected storage
complex would be shared among members of the reservoir community based on principles of proportionate and
coequal rights of use.
As Professor Pierce notes, the concept of correlative
rights fits neatly within the framework of limited common
property.18 Correlative rights refers to the notion that each

12.
13.

14.

15.
16.
17.

18.

www3.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/ghgemissions/VEF-Technical_
Document_072408.pdf ); Klass & Wilson, supra note 3, at 365.
Anderson, Subsurface “Trespass,” supra note 3 at 206-07 (“[t]he most serious
threat to efficient and utilitarian use of the subsurface is the possibility of
injunctive relief or ejectment”).
Zadick, supra note 10, at 267 (citing Jerry R. Fish & Thomas R. Wood,
Geologic Carbon Sequestration, Property Rights, and Regulation, 54 Rocky
Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 3-1, 3-19 (2008)) (“The sort of large-scale CCS needed
to mitigate continued and increased reliance on fossil fuels cannot begin
without a clear delineation of the legal property interests involved.”).
David E. Pierce, Carol Rose Comes to the Oil Patch: Modern Property Analysis
Applied to Modern Reservoir Problems, 19 Pa. St. Envtl. L. Rev. 241, 25960 (2011). For a discussion of an adaptive approach to property interests in
other contexts, see Arnold, supra note 1; Carol Rose, Energy and Efficiency
in the Realignment of Water Rights, 19 J. Legal Stud. 261 (1990).
Pierce, supra note 14, at 244.
Id. (citing Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace
and Folk Tales, Emission Trades, and Ecosystems, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 129, 132
(1998)).
Id. at 254 (citing 1 W.L. Summers, The Law of Oil and Gas 180 (1954)).
Rather than creating what Professor Summers describes as a “legal privilege
as against other owners of land therein to take oil and gas therefrom”—
permitting withdrawal without conversion, a legal privilege in the nonmineral pore space would grant other owners within the storage complex a
privilege to fill through injection—permitting storage without trespass.
Id. at 245-46.
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property owner in a common pool or source of supply has
the opportunity to use his or her just and equitable share
of that property.19 Given the established legal framework
of correlative rights in oil and gas, it provides a foundation
on which laws governing the use of subsurface property for
non-mineral purposes can be constructed. While of necessity this Article draws from cases and writings related to
use of the pore space for mineral development, its primary
focus is on trespasses resulting from non-mineral uses in
non-hydrocarbon-bearing subsurface strata. Since courts
have yet to adjudicate disputes resulting from migration
of injected carbon dioxide (CO2) for CCS purposes, the
Article proceeds based on the assumption that the modern
approach to subsurface trespasses would apply.
The Article begins with a brief explanation of the process of carbon capture and an introduction to the issues
of transboundary migration of injected substances. Part
II summarizes the property interests of surface owners in
the non-mineral subsurface, focusing on state declarations
of pore space ownership and the still-undefined issue of
federal pore space ownership. Part III examines the extent
to which owners of pore space interests have a protectable
property interest, including an analysis of case law and
academic literature relative to subsurface trespasses and
the available remedies. This part argues that the hesitance
of courts to find an actionable trespass in the absence of
interference with the use and enjoyment of a prior established use conflates the requirements of trespass with those
of nuisance, thereby forcing property owners to “capture”
their property interests and treating rights in pore space as
incorporeal. Part IV argues that the traditional correlative
rights model used in oil and gas reservoirs offers a solution
to the trespass problem in a manner that will encourage
private ordering, preserve a protectable private-property
interest in the pore space, and encourage investment in
CCS projects.

I.

CCS and the Problem of Trespass

Carbon capture20 has been identified as a critical component to meeting internationally established goals related
to climate change.21 The greatest anthropogenic sources
of CO2 are electricity and transportation fuels.22 Thus,
19. Id. at 254-59.
20. Carbon capture is also referred to as carbon sequestration, geologic storage,
and/or carbon storage. While there are some differentiations between these
definitions, they are not materially distinguishable with respect to the
property issues addressed in this Article. Note that this Article does not
address associated storage resulting from the use of CO2 during enhanced oil
recovery (CO2-EOR) operations. Since associated storage during CO2-EOR
occurs as a result of the lawful use of the mineral owner, and any resultant
drainage is considered protected by the rule of capture, subsurface trespass
issues are not implicated to the same extent as with other forms of CCS.
For a discussion of the negative rule of capture and associated storage, see
Anderson, Subsurface “Trespass,” supra note 3, at 230-36.
21. U.S. Dep’t. of Energy, Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Storage:
Climate Change, Economic Competitiveness, and Energy Security
(2016), https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2016/09/f33/DOE%20-%20
Carbon%20Capture%20Utilization%20and%20Storage_2016-09-07.pdf.
22. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas
Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2014 (2016) (EPA 430-R-16-002), available
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together with other “climate wedges” such as biological
storage and energy-efficiency improvements, decarbonizing these sources of emissions offers the potential of stabilizing atmospheric CO2 concentrations at a level that could
prevent the most catastrophic climate change.23 While, like
all carbon mitigation technologies, CCS alone is incapable
of solely achieving climate stabilization, scalable implementation of CCS technology has considerable potential as
one part of a comprehensive climate mitigation strategy.24
CCS refers to the process of capturing, compressing,
transporting, and then injecting compressed CO2 into
underground geologic formations for storage.25 Injection
sites for storage projects are evaluated and identified based
on integrity, containment, storage capacity, and injectivity
estimates.26 Once a candidate site is identified, the storage project is permitted, wells are drilled, and the injection
phase begins.27
During the injection phase, captured CO2 is injected
into what is called the “storage complex” for containment.28
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
defines the “storage complex” in its draft standard as the
“subsurface geological system extending vertically to comprise storage unit(s) and primary and secondary seal(s), and
extending laterally to the defined limits of the CO2 storage
project.”29 The draft ISO definition then notes that limits
of the complex “can be defined by natural geologic boundaries, regulation, or legal rights.”30
Importantly, the definition itself contemplates that legal
entitlements, including property rights and requirements
established by the applicable regulatory authority, may
limit the extent of the storage complex or determine storage
boundaries and that injected substances may migrate both
horizontally and vertically within that complex. Taken
together, the amount of land necessary to fully contain a
storage complex is immense, thus presenting a challenge to
would-be injectors tasked with assembling property rights
within the entire storage area.31 As one practitioner in the
field writes, “even a pilot scale project associated with a
single 1,000 megawatt (‘Mw’) coal-fired power plant could
require acquisition of subsurface storage rights over a radius
of six miles.”32

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

32.

at https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-04/documents/us-ghginventory-2016-main-text.pdf.
Stephen Pacala & Robert Socolow, Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate
Program for the Next 50 Years With Current Technologies, Science, Aug. 13,
2004.
Id.
Klass & Wilson, supra note 3, at 373-77.
Int’l Org. for Standardization, ISO/DIS 27914: Carbon Dioxide Capture,
Transportation and Geologic Storage—Geologic Storage, http://www.iso.org/
iso/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber=64148 (last visited Mar. 21, 2017).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Zadick, supra note 10, at 273 (citing R. Lee Gresham, Geologic CO2
Sequestration and Subsurface Property Rights: A Legal and Economic
Analysis iv (Dec. 1, 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Carnegie
Mellon University), available at http://repository.cmu.edu/dissertations/8).
Delissa Hayano, Guarding the Viability of Coal and Coal-Fired Power Plants:
A Road Map for Wyoming’s Cradle to Grave Regulation of CO2 Sequestration,
9 Wyo. L. Rev. 139, 141 (2009) (citing Steven L. Bryant, Geologic CO2
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Scholars have recognized the issue of transboundary
migration and trespass as critical to the practical, legal, and
economic viability of CCS projects.33 The enormous scale
of CCS projects, combined with the challenges of modeling precisely how a CO2 plume is expected to behave once
it is injected into the brine, create uncertainty in numerous
areas of law.34 These challenges led one scholar to declare
that “the major barriers to CCS are legal, not technical,
and involve issues of liability, storage field unitization, trespass, and takings.”35 In his article, Trae Gray echoes these
concerns, warning would-be lessors of pore space that “the
causes of action we will likely see from this type of activity
are negligence, negligence per se, subsurface trespass, nuisance, and strict liability.”36
Model and state rules for CCS operations likewise contemplate the possibility of migration within the storage
complex and outside of unit boundaries. The Interstate Oil
and Gas Compact Commission (IOGCC) has developed
the Model Statute and Model Rules and Regulations for
Carbon Storage.37 The Model Rules acknowledge the possibility of migration, both within the storage complex and to
surrounding formations or the surface.38 To guard against
any such migration, the Model Rules recommend that the
operator address in its injection plan how “the mechanisms
of confinement will ‘prevent migration of CO2 beyond the
proposed storage reservoir.’”39
Wyoming’s CCS law likewise contemplates the possibility that injected substances may migrate outside the “unit
area” by providing that the unit can be modified upon
application by an owner of pore space not included in the
unit area.40 However, the availability of an administrative
remedy for inclusion in the unit by no means preempts the
pursuit of other common-law tort remedies.41 The grant of

33.
34.
35.
36.

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Storage—Can the Oil and Gas Industry Help Save the Planet?, 54 Rocky
Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 2-1, 2-8 (2008)).
Zadick, supra note 10, at 269 (The potential liability related to subsurface
trespass claims could render CCS economically infeasible.) (citing Anderson,
Subsurface “Trespass,” supra note 3, at 255, and Gresham, supra note 31).
Philip M. Marston & Patricia A. Moore, From EOR to CCS: The Evolving
Legal and Regulatory Framework for Carbon Capture and Storage, 29 Energy
L.J. 421, 439 (2008).
Zadick, supra note 10, at 267-68 (citing Will Reisinger et al., Reconciling
King Coal and Climate Change: A Regulatory Framework for Carbon Capture
and Storage, 11 Vt. J. Envtl. L. 1, 2-3 (2009)).
Trae Gray, A 2015 Analysis and Update on U.S. Pore Space Law—The
Necessity of Proceeding Cautiously With Respect to the “Stick” Known as Pore
Space, 1 Oil & Gas, Nat. Resources & Energy J. 227, 326 (2015) (citing
Marston & Moore, supra note 34, at 490).
IOGCC, Interstate Oil & Gas Compact Commission Task Force
on Carbon Capture & Geologic Storage: A Legal and Regulatory
Guide for States & Provinces 15, 22 (2007).
Id. at 39-46.
Hayano, supra note 32, at 158 (quoting IOGCC, supra note 37, at 26).
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §35-11-313-316 (2011).
Kramer, supra note 5, at 315 (citing 8 Patrick H. Martin & Bruce M.
Kramer, Williams & Meyers Oil & Gas Law §§22.04, 24.02[2][a] (2015);
Pickrell Drilling Co. v. Kansas Corp. Comm’n, 654 P.2d 477 (Kan. 1982);
Merritt v. Corporation Comm’n, 438 P.2d 495 (Okla. 1968); Preferred
Energy Props. v. Wyoming State Bd. of Equalization, 890 P.2d 1110 (Wyo.
1995); and quoting FPL Farming Ltd. v. Environmental Processing Sys.,
L.C., 351 S.W.3d 306 (Tex. 2011)):
As a general rule, a permit granted by an agency does not act to
immunize the permit holder from civil tort liability from private
parties for actions arising out of the use of the permit . . . . Of
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an administrative permit alone does not preclude claims
for trespass.42 Accordingly, as states rush to enact legislation to regulate and allocate property interests within the
pore space, it is worth unpacking the issue of subsurface
trespass resulting from transboundary migration within
and beyond the storage complex.

II.

Ownership in the Subsurface

This part examines rights of ownership in the subsurface,
particularly the non-hydrocarbon reservoirs of pore space.
It begins with a brief description of pore space and an overview of the background of academic literature, case law,
and statutory declarations concerning its ownership and
use. This part then explores whether the property interest in the pore space should be categorized as corporeal or
incorporeal property.

A.

The Pore Space

Imagine a split bone—despite the calcified and compact
exterior, the inside is spongy, or cancellous; between the
mesh-like sheets and spikes of bone are tiny cavities filled
with marrow. Rocks have a similar sponginess, albeit on a
microscopic level. Between the physical matter of the rock
structure are tiny spots of interspersed vacuity known as
pores, which together create the pore space of the rock.43
Together, they comprise the iterative structure of a reservoir,
within which may be contained any number of substances:
freshwater (otherwise known as an aquifer), brackish water,
air, or hydrocarbons.44 These reservoirs also create the underground storage complexes necessary for CCS.45
Describing pore space in layperson’s terms without delving into complex scientific details can be a challenge. Prof.
Bruce Kramer refers to pore space simply as “the Rock.”46
Drawing from the Greek and Latin roots of the words
“pore” and “porosity,” poros and porus, both meaning passages, I find it helpful to describe pore space as the passages
in the rock.47 However, this definition too is limited. While

42.

43.
44.

45.
46.
47.

course, statutory remedies may preempt common law actions or
other standards that may set the bar for liability in tort, but a permit is not a get out of tort free card.
Id.; see also Gray, supra note 36 (describing Snyder Ranches, Inc. v. Oil
Conservation Comm’n of N.M., 798 P.2d 587 (N.M. 1990) (“Mobil
could be held liable for a subsurface trespass even though the injection was
approved by the Oil Conservation Commission.”).
Pore (n.1(c)), The Oxford English Dictionary Online (2017) (“A
minute interstice between particles of matter esp. in soil or rock; a minute
hole or channel in a surface, fabric, natural or artificial membrane.”).
Richard C. Selley & Stephen A. Sonnenberg, Elements of Petroleum
Geology 225 (3d ed. 2015); Sally M. Benson & David R. Cole, CO2
Sequestration in Deep Sedimentary Formations, 4 Elements 325 (2008)
(discussing the various physical and geochemical processes whereby CO2
is sequestered); 8 Patrick H. Martin & Bruce M. Kramer, Williams &
Meyers Manual of Oil and Gas Terms (2015) (definition of “Porosity
of Rock”) (“The porosity of rock ‘measures the capacity of the rock to hold
oil, gas, and water’ based on the ‘relative volume of the pore spaces between
mineral grains as compared to the total rock volume.’”).
Zadick, supra note 10, at 267.
Kramer, supra note 5, at 294.
Pore (n.1), The Oxford English Dictionary Online (2017). In her
helpful comments to this Article, my colleague Danielle Cover at University
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it may describe the pores themselves, it fails to convey the
multifarious characteristics of the pores and rock in which
they are situated that together determine the property that
is necessary for CCS.
As part of efforts to clarify the ownership and use of
the subsurface for both hydrocarbon and non-mineral
purposes, state legislatures have statutorily defined “pore
space.”48 Some states take a broad and technical approach
to the definition. For example, Oklahoma, in its statutory
definition of “land,” defines “pore space” as “any interstitial space not occupied by soil or rock, within the solid
materials of the earth, and any cavity, hold, hollow or void
space within the solid material of the earth.”49 Similarly,
North Dakota, in the context of CO2 underground storage, defines “pore space” as any “cavity or void, whether
natural or artificially created, in a subsurface sedimentary
stratum.”50 These definitions are broad, encompassing any
pore space that may exist at any strata and for any purpose. As such, the definitions of pore space in these states
would apply to the pore space within hydrocarbon and
non-hydrocarbon reservoirs alike.51
Other states’ statutory definitions supplant the technical definition of pore space with an overlay qualifying pore
space as something that must have a specific suitability
of use in CCS. Wyoming, in its legislative declaration of
ownership of the pore space, defines “pore space” as “subsurface space which can be used as storage space for carbon
dioxide or other substances.”52 Similarly, Kentucky defines
“pore space” as “the voids in the subsurface reservoir strata
suitable to contain stored carbon dioxide.”53 In these states,
rather than referring to the broader class of subsurface space
that exists to some degree in all strata below the surface,
the legal definition is more narrow: pore space is limited
to that which can be used for CCS.54 Accordingly, Wyoming and Kentucky exclude hydrocarbon-saturated pore
space and the pore space of freshwater aquifers from their
definitions. To the extent that both states have declared
pore space as private property of the surface owner, that

48.

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

of Wyoming described pore space as the “spaces in the rocks.” However, it is
important to note that a rock’s porosity is separate from its permeability—
which measures how well gasses or fluids move through rocks. The two
are separate geologic concepts and the potential utility of a subsurface
formation depends on both porosity and permeability.
Even in states where pore space has not been specifically defined, there
are frequently references to pore spaces within statutes, including those
addressing groundwater, brownfield redevelopment, dry cleaners, and
hydraulic fracturing. See, e.g., 225 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 732/1-5 (2013)
and 415 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 135/5 (1997) (defining groundwater as
water below the land surface that is within the saturated zone or geologic
materials where the fluid pressure in the pore space is equal to or greater
than atmospheric pressure); N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law §27-1405 (2014)
(defining residual contamination as “contamination remaining . . . in
surface or subsurface soil, geologic matrix pore spaces or fractures”); Mich.
Comp. Laws Ann. §324.31701 (1994) (defining groundwater as “water
in the zone of saturation that fills all of the pore spaces of the subsurface
geologic material”).
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 60, §60-6 (2014).
N.D. Cent. Code Ann. §38-22-02 (2015).
The pore space would not include the hydrocarbons within those pores,
which are subject to removal by the mineral owner.
Wyo. Stat. §34-1-152(d) (2011).
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §353.800(7) (West 2011).
Id.; Wyo. Stat. §34-1-152(d) (2011).
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declaration is limited to pore space that can be used for
carbon capture.55

B.

Ownership of the Pore Space

Ownership of the pore space may be determined by statute,
conveyancing language in a deed,56 or the common law.57
As a result, despite growing consensus in state approaches,
there is no hard-and-fast rule of pore space ownership.58 In
states where the legislature has not made its intent clear,
determination of pore space ownership requires an investigation into the case law and the facts and circumstances
surrounding the specific parcel conveyed.59 Many of these
cases turn on whether the property considered is owned in
fee simple; whether the minerals have been leased or separately conveyed; the purpose for which the pore space will
be used; and whether the stratum considered is mineralbearing or non-mineral, or is a depleted stratum where
hydrocarbons were previously produced.60 As a result of
these nuances, in several states, the ownership of the pore
space underlying a particular parcel may be unclear.61
The majority of courts that have ruled on the issue
have concluded that pore space is included in the surface estate.62 Consistent with the proposition that ownership of property extends from the sky to the center of
the earth, it follows that the owner of a fee simple inter55. Because the definition of “pore space” in the Kentucky and Wyoming
statutes is limited to pore space that is suitable for storage of CO2 or
other substances, it raises the question of who owns the remainder of
the subsurface, including the pore space, in strata that are unsuitable for
storage. An additional complication is that pore space that is suitable for
CO2 storage could have residual hydrocarbon saturations.
56. Emeny v. United States, 412 F.2d 1312, 1323 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Burlington
Res. Oil & Gas Co., LP v. Land & Sons Inc., 259 P.3d 766 (Mont. 2011);
Department of Transp. v. Goike, 560 N.W.2d 365 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996);
Tate v. United Fuel Gas Co., 71 S.E.2d 65 (W. Va. 1952).
57. For an overview of cases addressing pore space ownership, see Kramer, supra
note 5; Anderson, Geologic CO2, supra note 3; Zadick, supra note 10; Gray,
supra note 36.
58. Zadick, supra note 10, at 281:
[T]he common law has inconsistently dealt with both whether the
surface owner retains ownership of the pore spaces when the mineral estate has been severed (revealing whether they are an intrinsic
part of the surface estate), and whether the surface owner possesses
a right to excludability when the alleged pore space trespass has
produced no real harm.
Reisinger et al., supra note 35, at 2-3 (noting that the cases that have dealt
with subsurface storage “illustrate the lack of a consistent national view of
pore space ownership . . . [v]arious courts . . . have awarded gas storage
rights to surface and mineral holders alike”).
59. For a comprehensive and up-to-date summary of these cases, see Gray, supra
note 36, at 281-323. Even where states have made a declaration of pore
space ownership, an investigation of title would still be necessary to determine whether there existed any limitations in the chain of title or whether
any specific severance of pore space had been made.
60. Kramer, supra note 5, at 295-96.
61. Id. at 296 (“there is no simple answer to the question of who owns the pore
space of the ‘rock’ after severance”).
62. Jean Feriancek, Resolving Ownership of Pore Space, 26 Nat. Resources
& Env’t 49 (2012) (“Ownership of pore space by the surface owner is
considered the majority view in the United States.”); Christopher J. Miller,
Carbon Capture and Sequestration in Texas: Navigating the Legal Challenges
Related to Pore Space Ownership, 6 Tex. J. Oil, Gas & Energy L. 399,
401 (2010-2011); Blayne N. Grave, Carbon Capture and Storage in South
Dakota: The Need for a Clear Designation of Pore Space Ownership, 55 S.D.
L. Rev. 72, 73 (2010).
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est in property owns all that is above and below his or
her property, including the airspace and all subsurface
strata, pore space, and the minerals contained therein.63
Following severance of the minerals, the surface owner
retains all that was not conveyed.64 As the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined, “it unbearably strains credulity to suggest that a surface estate, conveyed in a deed describing the land in horizontal terms,
only touches a millimeter of the surface, and excludes all
other land below the surface.”65
The determination of whether or not pore space rights
have been conveyed or reserved depends on the nature of
the conveyance.66 For example, an oil and gas lease conveys
rights to explore for and produce hydrocarbons and certain rights incident to such exploration and production.67
It does not convey “any right to use the premises for any
purpose other than the specified mineral exploration and
production.”68 Thus, not having been conveyed, the surface owner retains the “geological structures beneath the
surface, including any such structure that might be suitable for the underground storage of ‘foreign’ or ‘extraneous’ gas produced elsewhere.”69
In a conveyance or reservation by deed, the majority of
cases seem to reach a similar conclusion. In Springer Ranch
v. Jones, a Texas court found that a conveyance of the minerals did not convey “ownership of the earth surrounding
those substances.”70 The decision relied in part on Fleming Foundation v. Texaco, Inc., in which the Texas Court
of Appeals found that “a conveyance of the surface only
in a tract of land with a reservation of the minerals vests
in the grantee such rights to the use thereof as are usually exercised by owners in fee subject only to the right of
the grantor to remove the minerals reserved.”71 The Fifth
Circuit summarized that “Texas law establishes that the
holder of a mineral estate has the right to exploit minerals,
but does not own the subsurface mass.”72
Similarly, in Montana, a court found that a reservation of minerals did not include “the pore space or other
non-mineral materials” and that the “[t]he pore space
63. Owen L. Anderson, Lord Coke, The Restatement and Modern Subsurface
Trespass Law, 6 Tex. J. Oil, Gas & Energy L. 203, 210 (2010) [hereinafter
Lord Coke]; Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d
1, 11 (Tex. 2008); Del Monte Min. & Milling Co. v. Last Change Min. &
Milling Co., 171 U.S. 55, 65-67 (1898).
64. Anderson, Geologic CO2, supra note 3, at 99-100 (citing Duhig v. PeavyMoore Lumber Co., 144 S.W.2d 878, 880 (Tex. 1940)); Cabrita Point
Dev., Inc. v. Evans, Nos. 2006-103, 2006-109, 2009 WL 3245202 (D.V.I.
Sept. 30, 2009) (citing 14 Powell on Real Property §81.02 (Michael
Allan Wolf ed. 2000) (“It is beyond peradventure that a parcel owned, and
not conveyed, is retained by the owner.”).
65. Dunn McCampbell Royalty Interest, Inc. v. National Park Serv., 630 F.3d
431, 442, 41 ELR 20063 (5th Cir. 2011).
66. Kramer, supra note 5, at 296-97.
67. Key Operating & Equip., Inc. v. Hegar, 435 S.W.3d 794, 44 ELR 20134
(Tex. 2014); Kartch v. EOG Res., Inc., 845 F. Supp. 2d 995 (D.N.D.
2012).
68. Emeny v. United States, 412 F.2d 1319 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
69. Id.
70. 421 S.W.3d 273 (Tex. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Emeny, 412 F.2d at 284).
71. 337 S.W.2d 846, 851 (Tex. Ct. App. 1960).
72. Dunn McCampbell Royalty Interest, Inc. v. National Park Serv., 630 F.3d
431, 442, 41 ELR 20063 (5th Cir. 2011).
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beneath [the surface owner’s] property belongs to [his]
surface estate in the same manner that all the non-mineral material beneath the physical boundaries of [the surface owner’s] property belongs to [his] surface estate.” 73
These cases, while stopping short of an absolute declaration for all purposes, strongly favor surface ownership of
pore space to the extent that such ownership does not
conflict with or upend well-established principles of mineral estate dominance. Similarly, cases in “Oklahoma,
Louisiana, New York, Michigan, West Virginia, New
Mexico, and California all recognize the surface owner’s
ownership of underground pore space for gas storage
operations,” 74 and thus would likely similarly find that
the surface owner would own pore space useful to operations for CCS.
A small minority of cases, almost entirely related to gas
storage, indicates a possibility that a split-estate mineral
owner could own the pore space.75 These cases follow a narrow line of reasoning that considers pore space and minerals as inalienable and that stems in part from the fact that
in these cases the storage resources sought were “mineralbearing.”76 One case often cited for adoption of this reasoning is Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co. v. Smallwood.77 In
that case, the court found that a surface landowner was not
entitled to compensation from the mineral owner for nonnative gas stored beneath her lands. This case is often cited
as standing for the adoption of the English Rule of pore
space ownership and as an exception to the majority rule
of vesting pore space ownership with the owner(s) of the
surface. However, Kentucky has since legislatively declared
that pore space suitable for carbon storage is owned by the
surface owner and, accordingly, at least with respect to its
holdings related to non-mineral pore space, Smallwood
may no longer be good law.78
Despite declarations of its demise,79 vestiges of the
minority view still exist. For example, in City of Kenai v.
Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska, LLC, an Alaska court
found in 2016 that the state of Alaska, through a mineral
reservation, had retained the rights to use the economically
depleted reservoir for gas storage.80 The court in City of
Kenai relied on a number of factors in reaching its decision
73. Burlington Res. Oil & Gas Co., LP v. Lang & Sons Inc., 259 P.3d 766, 770
(Mont. 2011).
74. Stefanie L. Burt, Who Owns the Right to Store Gas: A Survey of Pore Space
Ownership in U.S. Jurisdictions, 4 Joule, http://www.duqlawblogs.org/
joule/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Who-Owns-the-Right-to-Store-GasA-Survey-of-Pore-Space-Ownership-in-U.S.-Jurisdictions-.pdf.
75. Anderson, Geologic CO2, supra note 3, at 103; Kramer, supra note 5, at 299.
76. Anderson, Geologic CO2, supra note 3, at 103 (citing Mapco, Inc. v. Carter,
808 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991), rev’d on other grounds, 817 S.W.2d
686 (Tex. 1991)).
77. 252 S.W.2d 866, overruled on other grounds by Texas Am. Energy Corp. v.
Citizens Fid. Bank & Trust Co., 736 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. 1987).
78. Id.
79. Barry Barton, The Common Law of Subsurface Activity: General Principle and
Current Problems, in The Law of Energy Underground 21 (Donald N.
Zillman et al. ed., Int’l Bar Ass’n 2014) (“Pore space is generally owned and
possessed by the landowner not the mineral owner . . . . There is no English
Rule to the Contrary.”).
80. 373 P.3d 473 (Alaska 2016). The court in City of Kenai relied extensively on
scholarship suggesting that pore space rights may be included in sovereign
reservations of the minerals. See, e.g., Kevin L. Doran & Angela M. Ciphor,
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that the state’s mineral reservation encompassed the pore
space, including the state’s right to dispose of the surface,
the language in the city’s patent, prior conveyances of the
“subsurface estate” pursuant to the Alaska Lands Act, and
existing reservations by the state in oil and gas leases that
reserved to the state as mineral owner the right to authorize
storage of gas.81 While the precise facts that contributed
to the court’s determination in City of Kenai are unlikely
to apply broadly to interpretation of other deeds, the case
indicates the highly nuanced and specific analysis required
to ascertain pore space ownership and serves as a reminder
that a specific inquiry into the title and ownership of the
pore space in split estates is necessary even where the law
on the matter appears settled.
Increasingly, ownership of pore space is defined by statute. In 2008 and 2009, in acknowledgement of the potential value of the non-mineral pore space and in anticipation
of federal laws creating a demand for CCS projects, states
rushed to statutorily clarify ownership of the pore space.82
Accordingly, in Kentucky, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and
Wyoming, ownership of the pore space that has not previously been separately conveyed has been statutorily granted
to the surface owner.83 While these declarations have yet to
be challenged, Prof. Owen Anderson has suggested that,
until there is some case law to the contrary, it is “likely that
at least with respect to private and state lands the courts
will respect the legislature’s designation.”84
Interestingly, Kentucky’s declaration does not necessarily conflict with Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co. This
creates the possibility of a tiered ownership of pore space in
Kentucky, in which mineral owners are considered to own
pore space that is used for purposes necessarily incident to
the mineral interest, such as gas storage in a depleted reservoir, and in which surface owners are found to own those
spaces that are “suitable for stored carbon dioxide.”85 One
challenge of this approach is that in many cases, it may
not be decisively clear whether a specific stratum is or is
not mineral-bearing and, thus, which approach to ownership should apply. Examples of this are strata that contain
minerals (hydrocarbon or otherwise) that are not presently
economically producible at current prices or with available technologies, or depleted gas reservoirs with stranded
minerals that may in the future become economic via the
advent of new techniques. In these scenarios, the surface
owner may have a property interest in the mineral-bearing
pore space, but could be limited in any use of such pore
space to uses that did not damage or otherwise interfere

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Does the Federal Government Own the Pore Space Under Private Lands in the
West, 42 Envtl. L. 527 (2012).
Id.
Zadick, supra note 10, at 259; Arnold W. Reitze Jr., Electric Power in a
Carbon Constrained World, 34 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 821,
852-53 (2010).
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §34-1-152 (2011); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §353.800 (West
2011); N.D. Cent. Code §47-31-03 (West 2011); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit.
60, §60-6(B)(2) (2011).
Anderson, Geologic CO2, supra note 3, at 137.
Ky. Rev. Stat. §353.800 (West 2011).
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with the dominant mineral interest.86 Further, while no
court has addressed the issue, it is possible to presume that,
were a reservoir suitable for both natural gas and CO2 storage, the historical doctrine of mineral estate dominance
would apply.87
These statutory declarations are not necessarily dispositive
with respect to federally reserved minerals or tribal property
within state borders.88 The federal government owns approximately 640 million acres of surface and approximately 700
million acres of mineral rights, at least 58 million of which
underlie nonfederal private surface land.89 The majority of
these lands are either acquired lands or lands in which mineral rights were reserved as part of the grant of land patents
under the disposal laws of the early 20th century.90 Thus far,
no case has sought to determine the federal government’s
ownership of pore space on split-estate parcels where it owns
solely a surface or mineral interest.91 Such a determination
will likely depend on whether pore space can be classified as
a “mineral” that was reserved, like coal or oil and gas, in the
early land disposition laws.92
There is not a closed set of substances that constitute
a “mineral” under these land disposition acts, and thus
a precise definition of “mineral” in those acts has never
been clear.93 It is unlikely that cases focusing principally
on a mineral’s chemical composition or the ordinary common meaning of the term “mineral” would classify pore
space as mineral.94 However, dicta from a number of cases
interpreting mineral reservations under early land disposal
statutes leave open the possibility that a court could find
the federal government as owning the pore space as a splitestate mineral owner.95
86. The extent of a surface owner’s rights in the subsurface—and the mineral
owner or lessees right to exclude others from the subsurface—is presently
being considered by the Texas Supreme Court. In Lightning Oil Co. v.
Anadarko E&P Onshore LLC, 480 S.W.3d 628 (Tx. App. 2015), the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the mineral lessee could
not exclude others from the subsurface earth and that surface owner could
grant an adjacent lessee the right to locate a well on the surface and drill
through the subsurface to reach the adjoining mineral estate where such use
would not tortuously interfere with the underlying mineral lease. Kentucky
has previously affirmed the dominance of the mineral estate in Akers v.
Baldwin, 736 S.W.2d 294 (Ky. 1987) (citing McIntire v. Marion Coal Co.,
190 Ky. 342, 227 S.W. 298 (1921)).
87. For a discussion of how the dominant-servient estate doctrine may impede
development of “new, fledgling energy sources,” see K.K. Duvivier, Sins of
the Father, 1 Tex. A & M J. Real Prop. 301 (2014).
88. See Gray, supra note 36, at 319 (citing Anderson, Geologic CO2, supra note
3, at 136-38).
89. See U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., Public Land Statistics 2015 tbl.1-3,
at 7 (2016), available at https://www.blm.gov/public_land_statistics/pls15/
pls2015.pdf.
90. Id.
91. While many cases have assessed the extent of federal ownership and
dominion over split-estate minerals, few have looked at places where the
federal interest is limited to the surface estate under which lie privately
owned reserved minerals. One such case, Minard Run Oil Co. v. U.S.
Forest Serv., 670 F.3d 236, 41 ELR 20294 (3d Cir. 2011), indicates that
where the federal government owns only the surface, state laws on pore
space ownership may control. See Jonathan Thorpe, Minard Run Oil Co. v.
United States Forest Service, 36 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 567 (2012).
92. Doran & Ciphor, supra note 80.
93. Western Nuclear, Inc. v. Andrus, 475 F. Supp. 654 (D. Wyo. 1979).
94. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865 (1999).
95. Doran & Ciphor, supra note 80 (citing Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 462
U.S. 36, 13 ELR 20849 (1983); Western Nuclear, Inc., 475 F. Supp. 654).
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In Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court
emphasized that land grants should be construed to favor
the government and prohibit the passage of rights by implication.96 The Court in that case found that gravel could
be a mineral due to its distinguishability from the surface
and value apart from the soil, despite the fact that at the
time of the Stock Raising Homestead Act, the term “mineral” would not have been commonly thought to include
gravel.97 In what might be regarded as a particularly prescient dissent, Justice Lewis Powell wrote that the majority
opinion of Watt “could leave Western homesteaders with
the dubious assurance that only the dirt itself could not be
claimed by the Government.”98 Although state declarations
and controlling authority within the state may inform the
question, until courts definitively address whether mineral
reservations include pore space, questions as to pore space
ownership will remain.
Approximately 93% of federal land, and almost all split
estate land, is concentrated in the West.99 Proportions of
federal ownership vary from state to state, ranging from
nearly 35% in Arizona to more than 84% federal ownership in Nevada.100 Due to the large amount of land
needed for CCS projects, any project in the West is likely
to involve at least some public land.101 In addition to the
uncertainty with respect to pore space ownership under
federal split-estate public land, several other legal issues
exist regarding development of scalable projects on federal
land. These include the lack of a federal leasing program,
questions related to federal authority to lease pore space
for CCS under existing laws, and the applicability of the
National Environmental Policy Act to projects without
surface injection facilities on public land. Together, these
questions create a considerable obstacle to the development
of scalable CCS projects that include federal land.

C.

The Vertical Extent of Pore Space Ownership

Resolving the question of ownership alone is insufficient;
there is also the question of depth.102 As has become clear,
ownership is not necessarily infinite: there also exists a
question as to the vertical extent of private property.103
96.
97.
98.
99.

Watt, 462 U.S. 36.
Id.
Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
Carol Hardy Vincent et al., Congressional Research Service,
Federal Land Ownership: Overview and Data (2014), available at
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42346.pdf.
100. Id.
101. Christopher Galik et al., Duke University Nicholas Institute, The
Role of Public Lands in a Low Carbon Economy (2010) (“Federal lands
contain between 127 and 374 GtCO2 storage capacity, a small portion of the
total resource but significant in its own right”) (citing Nat’l Energy Tech.
Lab., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Storage of Captured Carbon Dioxide
Beneath Federal Lands (2009) (DOE/NETL-2009/1358)), available at
https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/sites/default/files/publications/the-roleof-public-lands-in-a-low-carbon-economy-paper.pdf.
102. Jules Verne, Journey to the Center of the Earth 119 (2014),
(“Wherever he saw a hole he always wanted to know the depth of it. To
him this was important.”).
103. John G. Sprankling, Owning the Center of the Earth, 55 U.C.L.A. L. Rev.
979 (2008); Patrick Wieland, Going Beyond Panaceas: Escaping Mining
Conflicts in Resource-Rich Countries Through Middle-Ground Policies,
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Lord Coke is often attributed the maxim that the owner
of land owns from the sky to the center of the earth.104
Yet, the resistance to an absolute application of ad coleum
in subsurface property has been apparent since as early as
1929.105 The Supreme Court in United States v. Causby
perhaps dealt the concept of absolutist property ownership
a fatal blow.106 Finding that the strong public interest in
air travel prohibited the finding of a taking resulting from
suprasurface intrusions to property by air traffic, the Court
wrote that the “common law doctrine that ownership of
land extends to the periphery of the universe . . . has no
place in the modern world.”107
It seems self-evident today that absolute ownership in
the deepest reaches of the subsurface is, at least in a way
that contemplates an absolute right of exclusion, as clearly
an impossibility as is absolute ownership of the upper
stratosphere.108 Prof. John Sprankling has posited absolute
ownership must have a terminus, below which everything
would be public, and that infinite ownership is “mere
poetic hyperbole, not law.”109 The English Court of Appeal
adopted this approach, finding that “there is no good reason why a court today should apply a discredited 13th century maxim so as [to] give the claimants [ ] title to substrata
so far beneath the surface that they have no conceivable use
for them.”110 That court, however, eventually held that the
2,800-foot-deep pore space in question was “not so deep
that the physical features such as temperature and pressure
would render the concept of the subsurface belonging to
anyone absurd.”111
While it is reasonable to assume that there are some
limits to the depths (or heights) of private ownership, each
of us would likely reach a different conclusion as to where
that would be: whereas one group might suggest that
ownership extends to all usable zones of the subsurface,
and thus that ownership and possession should extend as
technology makes possession in deeper subsurface strata
possible, others would suggest that the justifications
of private dominion become more diffuse as you move

20 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 199 (2013); Stuart S. Ball, The Vertical Extent of
Ownership in Land, 76 U. Pa. L. Rev. 631 (1928).
104. Anderson, Lord Coke, supra note 63.
105. Edwards v. Sims, 24 S.W.2d 619, 622 (Ky. 1929) (Logan, J., dissenting):
The age-old statement, adhered to in the majority opinion as the
law, in truth and fact, is not true now and never has been. I can
subscribe to no doctrine which makes the owner of the surface also
the owner of the atmosphere filling illimitable space. Neither can
I subscribe to the doctrine that he who owns the surface is also the
owner of the vacant spaces in the bowels of the earth.
106. 328 U.S. 256, 260-66 (1946).
107. Id.
108. Anderson, Subsurface “Trespass,” supra note 3, at 211. The deepest well
drilled to date, extending 40,230 feet, is the Kola Superdeep Borehole,
drilled in the Soviet Union in the 1970s. For an explanation of interspatial
property, see, e.g., Matthew Feinman, Mining the Final Frontier: Keeping
Earth’s Asteroid Mining Ventures From Becoming the Next Gold Rush, 14 U.
Pitt. J. Tech. L. & Pol’y 202 (2014); Benoit Ildefonse et al., Mission Moho
Workshop: Drilling Through the Oceanic Crust to the Mantle, 4 Sci. Drilling
11-18 (2007).
109. Sprankling, supra note 103, at 981.
110. Bocardo SA v. Star Energy UK Onshore Ltd., 3 W.L.R. 354 (2010).
111. Id.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2961477

Copyright © 2017 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.

47 ELR 10428

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER

deeper toward the center of the earth.112 Deep subsurface
use of property challenges conceptions of ownership in
that it makes clear the difficulty of excluding others or of
establishing possession in the way that traditionally gives
rise to claims of ownership.113
Thus, even in states where ownership of pore space has
been established, open questions remain as to the vertical extent to which an owner has an exclusive possessory
interest in all the rock, pore, and fluid under the property.
Acknowledgement of these limitations suggests that it may
be appropriate to frame interests in deep subsurface property suitable for CCS in a manner that reflects the realities
inherent in possession of pore space for that use.

D.

The Nature of the Property Interest in the
Pore Space: Corporeal or Incorporeal?

Property interests in the non-hydrocarbon pore space
have yet to be classified as either corporeal or incorporeal.
Ownership of oil and gas is classified as either corporeal
or incorporeal, also called possessory and nonpossessory.114 Possessory interests “give the holder the privileges and
rights of possession of the land, and are all present estates,
whether of the freehold or the non-freehold class.”115 In
contrast, incorporeal interests are inherently nonpossessory, “like reversions and remainders, which may develop
into possessory interests” and interests such as easements
or licenses, “which do not give the holder possession of
the land.”116 Some property lends itself toward possessory
ownership—most real property falls into this category: the
holder can use it, exclude others from it, and charge economic rents for its use.117 However, some potential property, such as wildlife, seems to elude possession, at least
until such point that it has been captured, and still other
“objects of property,” like ideas, are so disembodied that
they “seem inherently incapable of clear demarcation.”118
Historically, courts have struggled with the differentiation between the pore space and the oil and gas existing
within it, and whether each is corporeal or incorporeal
property.119 State approaches differ, often with overlapping
classifications.120 For example, just as early courts struggled
to classify ownership of whales and foxes,121 they found it
112. Id. at 2 (the depth of the surface at which minerals could be worked was not
so deep that physical features such as temperature and pressure would render
the concept of the subsurface belonging to anybody absurd); Sprankling,
supra note 103, at 1034-38 (Sprankling suggests that private ownership of
the non-hydrocarbon subsurface should terminate at 1,000 feet below the
surface, thus freeing certain high-public-benefit technologies such as CCS
and heat mining from the constraints of private ordering.).
113. Carol Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 73, 75
(1985).
114. Nancy Saint-Paul, Summers Oil and Gas §8.9 (3d ed. 2015).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Rose, supra note 113.
118. Id. at 83.
119. Grey-Mellon v. Fairchild, 292 S.W. 743, 745 (Ky. 1927) (“While the oil is
fugitive, the sand-bearing oil is as stationary as a bank of coal.”).
120. Saint-Paul, supra note 114.
121. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805); Swift v. Gifford, 23 F.
Cas. 558 (D. Mass. 1872) (No. 13696).
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similarly impossible to grant ownership in place to fugacious minerals that were subject to flight and could not
be properly classified as owned until they were reduced
to possession.122 As a result, many early courts classified
the ownership interest in oil and gas as incorporeal, and
likewise the oil and gas lease as creating an incorporeal
hereditament or a profit-à-prendre.123 While states such as
Colorado and Texas adopt a possessory view of oil and gas
in place, others, such as Kansas and Oklahoma, maintain
that there is no possessory right to oil and gas in place.124
While theories of ownership of oil and gas within pore
space may provide some insights into whether pore space
itself is considered corporeal or incorporeal property, the
interests are decidedly different. Oil and gas moves through
the reservoir and therefore cannot be fully and adequately
quantified until it has been reduced to absolute possession
at the surface of the land. Pore space, on the other hand, is
immobile: it can be filled, emptied and refilled, pressurized
or depressurized, and fractured to increase permeability,
but it fundamentally cannot be moved from one location
to another. As such, it is decidedly more corporeal than
fluid minerals.
However, there are some analogs between pore space
and more incorporeal forms of property. As Kevin Doran
and Angela Ciphor write, “[p]ore [s]pace is the conceptual
embodiment of nothing . . . outside of that generative
structure [that creates it], it does not exist.”125 While pore
space cannot exist separate from the rock that creates it, it
is itself defined not by what it is, but by what it can or does
contain.126 Owners of pore space may develop their interest into a stronger possessory claim based on their use, and
yet at any time prior to that use, they are also subject to
dispossession by virtue of their neighbors’ use.127 Therefore,
while the tangible bulk of the property cannot be ignored,
the present system for allocating property interests in pore
space is incorporeal chiefly in that while pore space may
physically exist in a clearly embodied form at all times, it is
still subject to capture.128
122. Rose, supra note 113, at 83; see, e.g., Jones v. Forest Oil Co., 194 Pa. 379,
44 A. 1074 (Pa. 1899); Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co., 39 W.L.B. 54 (Ohio 1897);
Kolachny v. Galbreath, 110 P. 902 (Okla. 1910).
123. Martin & Kramer, supra note 44 (definition of “Corporeal property”)
(“The differences in the classification of the severed interest as corporeal
or incorporeal may have important legal consequences with regards to the
following (1) abandonment; (2) remedies, such as ejectment and partition
. . . ; and (5) adverse possession.”).
124. Joan Burk, Petroleum Lands and Leasing 22 (1983).
125. Doran & Ciphor, supra note 80, at 527.
126. See discussion supra notes 47-51. This distinction has vexed courts seeking
to distinguish the ownership of the fluids within the rock from the physical
structure within which they were contained. See Gray-Mellon Oil Co. v.
Fairchild, 292 S.W. 743, 746 (Ky. Ct. App. 1927) (“The oil-bearing sands
are a part of the land. The conveyance of the exclusive right to use these
sands for the only purpose for which they can be used is necessarily a grant
of an interest in the land.”).
127. Vesting ownership based on first-in-time use creates what Professor
Sprankling has referred to as “First-in-Time Exploitative Use.” See
Sprankling, supra note 103, at 1035 (citing John G. Sprankling, An
Environmental Critique of Adverse Possession, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 816, 856
(1994)).
128. Sprankling, supra note 103, at 1035:
The logic of this model suggests that the surface owner holds no
subsurface rights until and unless she undertakes some economi-

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2961477

Copyright © 2017 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.

5-2017

NEWS & ANALYSIS

The resulting picture is that ownership of pore space is
a much more nuanced and intermingled concept of property than traditional hierarchical metaphors of property
suggest.129 There is no clear “bundle of sticks” in the pore
space with easily severable incidents of property that can be
distributed among surface and mineral owners.130 The pore
space may be owned by the surface owner, but to the extent
that it is “hydrocarbon saturated pore space,” it is subject to
the dominant rights of the mineral owner.131 These rights
include rights of entry, possession, use, and even destruction, as well as the right to dispose of wastewater or to
inject water or CO2 for enhanced oil recovery purposes.132
Similarly, even non-hydrocarbon pore space may be subject
to use by the mineral owner through exercise of its implied
easement to use the surface for purposes including wastewater disposal.133
Hydrocarbon pore space, once subject to entry by the
mineral owner, may revert to the exclusive dominion of the
surface owner once the hydrocarbon resource is depleted,
and then be subject to reentry again as technology develops
or commodity prices change in a manner that makes mineral use practicable again.134 And a surface owner, making
use of the pore space for non-mineral purposes such as disposal or CCS, may be limited in such use if it unreasonably
interferes with mineral operations. The result is a hybrid
ownership that seems both corporeal in its limited rights of
use and exclusion and yet incorporeal in its ambiguous vertical extent and vulnerability to capture. The eventual classification of pore space as either corporeal or incorporeal
property may prove dispositive as to the remedies available
to owners for subsurface intrusions.
cally viable subsurface use. Before that point, she holds merely a
potential, inchoate interest in the subsurface, just as one holding a
hunting license does not yet own any wild game.
129. Springer Ranch, Ltd. v. Jones, 421 S.W.3d 273, 284 (Tex. Ct. App. 2013)
(“We note that the physical structures and subsurface substances that the
surface estate and mineral estate owners possess are inherently intertwined,
at least with respect to hydrocarbons.”).
130. See Gray, supra note 36. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, there
are also pore space uses related to groundwater and freshwater aquifers.
131. See Martin & Kramer, supra note 44 (definition of “hydrocarbon saturated
pore space”); see Yates v. Gulf Oil Corp., 182 F.2d 286, 289 (5th Cir.
1950) (“the grant or reservation of minerals carries with it, as a necessary
appurtenance thereto, the right to use so much of the surface as may be
necessary to enforce and enjoy the mineral estate conveyed or reserved”
(quoting Harris v. Currie, 176 S.W.2d 302, 305 (Tex. 1943))); 4 Nancy
Saint-Paul, Summers Oil & Gas §40:4 (3d ed. 2014).
132. Ian J. Duncan, CO2-EOR 101: An Overview of CO2 Enhanced Oil Recovery,
in Enhanced Oil Recovery: Legal Framework for Sustainable
Management of Mature Oil Fields 1-2 (Rocky Mountain Mineral
Law Found. 2015); Feland v. Placid Oil Co., 171 N.W.2d 829 (N.D.
1969); Fischer v. Continental Res., Inc., 49 F. Supp. 3d 637, 646 (D.N.D.
2014).
133. Federal unitization may extend the mineral developer’s right to dispose of
wastewater into the subsurface pore space to the subsurface underlying any
leases within the unit. See Tara K. Righetti, Surface Access to Severed Federal
Minerals, 61 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 8-1 (2015) (discussing Entek GRB,
LLC v. Stull Ranches, LLC, 763 F.3d 1252, 44 ELR 20189 (10th Cir.
2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1895 (2015)).
134. Wendy B. Jacobs, Carbon Capture and Sequestration, in Global Climate
Change and U.S. Law 581 (Michael Gerrard & Jody Freeman eds., 2d ed.
2014) (“it will be no simple logistical matter to determine when precisely
the pore space within the mineral estate has been fully mined and has
reverted to the surface owner”).
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III. The Inadequacy of Remedies for
Subsurface Trespass
The traditional remedies for trespass are injunctive relief,135
ejectment,136 restitution,137 and damages.138 In addition
to recovery for unlawful use of property and any damage
caused thereby, an owner of property may also have the
right to prevent repeated intrusions and to force removal of
material unlawfully placed upon the property.139 In fact, a
prudent landowner has an obligation to do exactly that: a
persistent failure to remove a trespasser using property as
his or her own can result in vesting in the trespasser title by
adverse possession.140 However, a survey of cases regarding
subsurface trespasses resulting from transboundary migration of fluids reveals a hesitance by courts to enjoin further
trespasses or to award damages solely on the basis of an
injury to possession. Instead, in the majority of cases, remedies are limited to recovery for physical damage to the
property or unreasonable interference with that property’s
existing or foreseeable use.
Subsurface intrusions routinely occur in the context of
oil and gas development and production and wastewater
disposal.141 These intrusions take a variety of forms, including a process called “nudging,” whereby the heel of a well
deviates under an unleased parcel of land in order to enter
135. Hastings Oil Co. v. Texas Co., 234 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. 1950); Union Oil Co.
of Cal. v. Domengeaux, 86 P.2d 127, 130 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939). See Hastings
Oil Co., 234 S.W.2d at 398 (quoting 1 James L. High, A Treatise on the
Law of Injunctions 693, §730 (4th ed. 1905)) (Continuing trespasses and
trespasses to mining property are among those most suited to injunctive
relief since “they subtract from the very substance of the estate, hence equity
is quick to restrain them.”); Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the
Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14 J. Legal Stud. 13 (1985).
136. Martin & Kramer, supra note 44 (the definition of “Ejectment” is “a legal
action to recover the possession of land”); Picken v. Adams, 131 N.E.2d 38
(Ill. 1955); Barnsdall v. Bradford Gas Co., 74 A. 207 (Pa. 1909); Venture
Oil Co. v. Fretts, 152 Pa. 451, 25 A. 732 (1893).
137. In oil and gas cases, the amount that the owner is entitled to recover may turn
on whether the trespasser was acting in good faith, as a “mistaken improver
of property,” or bad faith as a willful trespasser. See Martin & Kramer, supra
note 41, §227 (“if the driller intentionally bottomed the well on another’s
land the trespass is in bad faith, and the trespasser is liable for the value of
the oil at the surface, i.e., without a credit for drilling and operating costs.”);
Peter K. Huber, Mistaken Transfers and Profitable Infringement on Property
Rights: An Economic Analysis, 49 La. L. Rev. 71 (1988).
138. Damages can be nominal, compensatory, or punitive. See Alexandra B.
Klass, Punitive Damages and Valuing Harm, 92 Minn. L. Rev. 83, 105-07
(2007); Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154 (1997); Journey
Acquisition-II, L.P. v. EQT Prod. Co., 830 F.3d 444 (6th Cir. 2016).
139. Kyle Graham, The Continuing Violations Doctrine, 43 Gonz. L. Rev. 271,
309-10; McCormick, supra note 4 (citing Clegg v. Dearden, 12 Q.B. 576,
590 (1848)) (“There is a legal obligation to discontinue a trespass or remove
a nuisance.”).
140. For an example of a subsurface trespasser who acquired a prescriptive
easement, see, e.g., Ellis v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 609 F.2d 436 (10th
Cir. 1979). It is an interesting and unresolved question whether possession of
the pore space through intrusion would be considered “open and notorious”
or whether a claimant who has met the requirements for adverse possession
through occupation of the “pore space” under a parcel from which minerals
have been severed will also obtain title to the land surface.
141. For a discussion of the situations in which a subsurface trespass may
arise, see, e.g., Anderson, Lord Coke, supra note 63; Keith Hall, Hydraulic
Fracturing: If Factures Cross Property Lines Is There an Actionable Subsurface
Trespass?, 54 Nat. Resources J. 361 (2014); Klass & Wilson, supra note
3; Christopher Kulander & R. Jordan Shaw, Comparing Subsurface Trespass
Jurisprudence—Geophysical Surveying and Hydraulic Fracturing, 46 N.M. L.
Rev. 67 (2016).
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the producing formation as near as possible to the lease
line,142 the bottoming of a slant well under the land of
another,143 the intrusion of hydraulic fracturing fluids by
forceful injection,144 and seeps of injected gas or wastewater
migrating through the pore space from a nearby parcel.145
If one applies an absolute corporeal theory of property to
the subsurface, each of these unauthorized entries offends
the inviolate rights of the property owner to exclusive possession and to exclude trespassers.146
Trespass is a tort against the right of exclusive possession by an owner of real property.147 Establishing exclusive possession in the subsurface can be challenging, as
few property owners actually exercise dominion over the
subsurface of their property in a manner that gives way
to strong claims of possession.148 However, as Prof. Keith
Hall notes, while “few landowners exercise actual possession of regions far above or below the surface . . . a landowner might have constructive possession of such regions,
and thus have a remedy against intrusions into the airspace
above or the subsurface below his land.”149 As the court
notes in Coastal Oil & Gas v. Garza Energy Trust, property
owners with both possessory and nonpossessory interests
can allege trespass.150
Despite early attestations that the instrumentality of
trespass is immaterial,151 the temporal and physical nature
of an intrusion may be material to determinations of
whether that intrusion interferes with the right to exclusive
possession.152 Unlike invasions that are temporary, fleeting, and ethereal, physical and permanent intrusions are
142. Despite the growing acknowledgement of the practice of nudging among
practitioners, the author could find no cases that directly addressed the
scenario of nudging. Note that while the act of nudging is a trespass, there
is no continuing trespass by permitting the void to remain. See Clegg v.
Dearden, 12 Adol. & E. (N.S.) 601.
143. Hancock Oil Co. v. Meeker-Garner Oil Co., 257 P.2d 988 (Cal. Ct. App.
1953).
144. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex.
2008).
145. Tidewater Oil Co. v. Jackson, 320 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1963); Crawford v.
Hrabe, 44 P.3d 442 (Kan. 2002); Chance v. BP Chems., 670 N.E.2d 985,
994 (Ohio 1996).
146. Anderson, Subsurface “Trespass,” supra note 3, at 205; Hall, supra note 141,
at 369-70; Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical &
Emotional Harm §50 (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2009), ch. 9 (2016) (A
trespasser is liable for intrusions by a thing that he has placed on or caused
to enter the land of another “without consent or other legal privilege.”);
Stephen D. Sugarman, Land-Possessor Liability in the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Too Much and Too Little, 44 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1079 (2009).
147. Hall, supra note 141, at 374 (citing W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser
and Keeton on Torts ch. 3, §13 at 77 (5th ed. 1984)) (noting that a
landowner need not have physical possession and that constructive
possession will suffice).
148. Sprankling, supra note 103, at 1023-25.
149. Hall, supra note 141, at 376.
150. 268 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Tex. 2008) (citing Keeton et al., supra note 147,
§13) (noting that a holder of a possessory interest in property must only
demonstrate injury to his or her right of possession through a physical entry
onto the land, whereas the holder of a non-possessory interest such as a
reversion must demonstrate “actual permanent harm to the property of such
sort as to affect the value of his [reversionary] interest”).
151. Whittaker v. Stangvick, 111 N.W. 295, 296 (Minn. 1907) (It is also entirely
immaterial by means of what instrumentality the trespass is committed.).
152. Miller v. Carnation Co., 516 P.2d 661 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973); Ingmundson
v. Midland Cont’l R.R., 173 N.W. 751 (N.D. 1919); Thomas W. Merrill,
Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14 J. Legal
Stud. 13 (1985).
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more likely to constitute an actionable trespass irrespective
of whether the surface owner suffered any actual harm.153
For example, courts are more likely to find a trespass
to airspace resulting from intrusions of “eaves, cornices,
roofs . . . [and] wires passing over a plaintiffs property”
than from intangible intrusions such as dust, noise, or
vibrations.154 Likewise, permanent subsurface occupations, such as the intrusion of a foundation wall, have
also been found the instruments of trespass.155 In addition
to the conversion arising from any resultant production,
numerous cases have recognized a trespass when a person
drills a directional well into the property of another, thus
physically occupying the space with the wellbore, cement,
pipe, and other downhole equipment.156
Transient incursions to the airspace, such as the firing
of trajectories or the passage of airplanes, and intangible
entries, such as noise, light, and vibration, have defied classification as actionable trespasses. For example, in Pickering
v. Rudd, the court found that “firing a loaded gun with
shot into a field was breaking the close” but “that firing in
vacuo could [not] be considered a trespass.”157 The majority of cases have found that the firing of a trajectory across
(and not onto) land is not a trespass unless the peaceful
enjoyment of the property is endangered thereby.158
Similarly, airspace intrusions resulting from “the mere
entry into the air space” by high altitude air travel are
excluded from the definition of trespass.159 Rather than
focusing on owners’ rights of exclusion, courts in air traffic
cases have engaged in a nuisance-based analysis—giving
heavy weight to the limited possessory interest of an owner
of property in the high-altitude airspace of the property
and balancing the relatively minor nature of the disturbance against the high social utility of the cause.160 This
153. Hanna v. ARE Acquisitions, LLC, 929 A.2d 892, 894 (Md. 2007) (citing
Restatement (Second) of Torts §§158, 161 (2016)) (Liability results
“irrespective of whether [the trespasser] causes harm to any legally protected
interest of the other” and “regardless whether or not [he] has the ability to
remove it.”).
154. Larry D. Scheafer, Annotation, Recovery in Trespass for Injury to Land Caused
by Airborne Pollutants, 2 A.L.R. 4th 1052 (1980); Hall, supra note 141, at
376 (citing Huber v. Stark, 102 N.W. 12 (Wis. 1905); Aiken v. Benedict, 39
Barb. 400 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1862); Harrington v. McCarthy, 48 N.E. 278
(Mass. 1897); Murphy v. Bolger, 15 A. 365 (Vt. 1888)); Adams v. Cleveland
Cliffs Iron Co., 602 N.W.2d 215 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
155. Rahn v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 79 N.W. 747 (Wis. 1899).
156. Hall, supra note 141, at 376 (citing Williams v. Continental Oil Co., 14
F.R.D. 58 (W.D. Okla. 1953); Hastings Oil Co. v. Texas Co., 234 S.W.2d
389 (Tex. 1950); Gliptis v. Fifteen Oil Co., 16 So. 2d 471 (La. 1944);
Alphonzo E. Bell Corp. v. Bell View Oil Syndicate, 76 P.2d 167 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1938)).
157. Whittaker v. Stangvick, 111. N.W. 295, 296 (Minn. 1907) (quoting
Pickering v. Rudd, 4 Camp. 219, 221 (1815)).
158. See, e.g., Clifton v. Bury (1887) 4 T.L.R. 8; Herrin v. Sutherland, 241 P. 328
(Mont. 1925); Whittaker, 111 N.W. at 295 (shooting of a trajectory alone is
not a trespass but becomes one where ducks fall on the land and the hunter
enters upon the land to retrieve them as a result).
159. Note, Trespass by Airplane, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 569 (1919); Stuart S. Ball, The
Vertical Extent of Ownership in Land, 76 U. Pa. L. Rev. 631 (1928) (citing
Salmond on the Law of Torts §52, 197 (5th ed. 1920)); For an excellent
overview of the law related to temporary intrusions in airspace related to
air travel, see Anderson, Lord Coke, supra note 63, at 211-14, Anderson,
Subsurface “Trespass,” supra note 3, at 253-55, and Hall, supra note 141, at
380.
160. Anderson, Lord Coke, supra note 63, at 211-14.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2961477

Copyright © 2017 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.

5-2017

NEWS & ANALYSIS

47 ELR 10431

approach, branded a “modern rule” of trespass, modifies
the ad coleum doctrine such that the “line between trespass
and nuisance has become wavering and uncertain.”161
Courts have applied a version of the modern rule of
trespass to cases involving the migration of injected fluids
across property lines in the deep subsurface, but without
abandoning the requirement of a tangible entry.162 These
cases principally occur in the context of four commercial activities related to energy exploration: (1) hydraulic
fracturing,163 (2) gas storage,164 (3) wastewater disposal,165
and (4) enhanced oil recovery.166 Unlike air travel or
the firing of a rifle across land—uses that by their very
natures are fleeting—subsurface intrusions resulting from
the migration of injected substances across property lines
result in a continual intrusion into subsurface property by
a tangible mass of gasses and/or fluids, perhaps contributing to lasting pressure changes and altered permeability
and fluid dynamics within the reservoir in an area that
extends far beyond the actual location of, for example, the
CO2 plume.167
However, courts have regularly distinguished these
intrusions from surface trespasses.168 In the absence of
“physical damage or interference”169 with the “reasonable and foreseeable use of the properties,”170 courts “have
largely refused to find harmless deep subsurface invasions actionable.”171 Requiring a showing of actual injury

destroys the property owner’s right to recover for purpresture under a theory of trespass quare clausum fregit. An
owner with a possessory interest in property can bring
an action in trespass quare clausum fregit for intentional
intrusions to his or her property, even if they cause no
damage.172 This denies the surface owner recovery for
injury to his or her rights of possession in the subsurface
and confounds the doctrines of trespass and nuisance by
requiring the landowner to demonstrate both an intentional physical intrusion onto the land and actual injury173
to the property or interference with the right to private
enjoyment of the subsurface.174
The erosion of the doctrine of trespass and the confusion
with the doctrine of nuisance treats subsurface property
in pore space as incorporeal, thus requiring an owner of
subsurface pore space to “capture” it before he is disseized
of it.175 In order to recover under the theory of damages
grounded in nuisance, surface owners must demonstrate
that they have some existing or foreseeable use of their subsurface property.176 In many cases, this makes monetary
recovery for subsurface intrusions unlikely.177
Further, the prerequisite of establishing use in the subsurface creates an unreasonably high hurdle for plaintiffs
trying to demonstrate the irreparable injury in order to
obtain injunctive relief against planned or repeated trespasses.178 Professor Sprankling describes this as the “de

161. Bradley v. American Smelting & Refining Co., 709 P.2d 782, 16 ELR
20346 (Wash. 1985).
162. Tucker v. Southwestern Energy Co., No. 1:11-cv-44-DPM, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20697 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 17, 2012):
The weight of authority from the other states appears to favor [the
producers] position that this scenario is a nuisance, not a trespass.
But the legal principles at work, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts
§158, support the trespass claim . . . . This claim may be suspenders
over the belt of nuisance.
163. My colleagues have provided compelling and thorough analyses of the
history of hydraulic fracturing trespasses; see Hall, supra note 141; Klass &
Wilson, supra note 3; Anderson, Lord Coke, supra note 63; Kulander & Shaw,
supra note 141; Pierce, supra note 14; Anderson, Subsurface “Trespass,” supra
note 3. For cases indicating that a trespass would result from the intrusion
of fracturing fluids, see, e.g., Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 344 S.W.2d
411, 412 (Tex. 1961); GeoViking, Inc. v. Tex Lee Operating Co., 817 S.W.2d
357 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991); Stone v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, No. 5:12CV-102, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71121 (N.D. W. Va. Apr. 20, 2013), order
vacated by 2013 WL 7863861 (N.D. W. Va. July 30, 2013) (The intrusion
of hydraulic fracturing fluids “result[s] in an actual, nonconsensual invasion
of the plaintiff’s property, which interferes with the plaintiff’s possession and
use of that property.”).
164. Beck v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 170 F.3d 1019 (10th Cir. 1999).
165. Chance v. BP Chems. Inc., 670 N.E.2d 985, 992 (Ohio 1996); FPL
Farming Ltd. v. Environmental Processing Sys., Inc., 351 S.W.3d 306 (Tex.
2011); Railroad Comm’n v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560, 567-68 (Tex. 1925);
Cassinos v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 574 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993).
166. Crawford v. Hrabe, 44 P.3d 442 (Kan. 2002).
167. Ruben Juanes et al., Impact of Relative Permeability Hysteresis on Geological
CO2 Storage, 42 Water Resources Res. W12418 (2006). There is some
ambiguity as to whether these lasting changes would constitute a continuing
trespass; see Christopher M. Rhymes, Environmental Contamination as
Continuing Trespass, 42 Envtl. L. 1381 (2012).
168. Anderson, Subsurface “Trespass,” supra note 3.
169. Chance, 670 N.E.2d at 989.
170. Id. at 993.
171. Anderson, Subsurface “Trespass,” supra note 3, at 204 (“Landowners must
suffer actual damages that affect their reasonable and foreseeable use of the
subsurface, not mere interference with title or possession.”); Raymond v.
Union Tex. Petroleum, 697 F. Supp. 270 (D. La. 1988); Chance, 670 N.E.2d

at 989; but see Cassinos v. Union Oil Co., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 574 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1993) (awarding damages based on the cost of paying for disposal of
other wastewater). A subset of gas storage cases have provided recovery for
subsurface trespasses on the basis of unjust enrichment; see, e.g., Beck v.
Northern Natural Gas Co., 170 F.3d 1019 (10th Cir. 1999), and Van Scyoc
v. Equitrans, L.P, No. 2:13-cv-01735, 2015 WL 1346872 (W.D. Pa. Mar.
23, 2015). However, the award of damages in the form of economic rents
for use of the property may stem from the fact that in some circumstances
the Natural Gas Act can provide the trespassers with condemnation
authority by way of a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission certificate.
While beyond the scope of this Article, a regulatory framework based on the
Natural Gas Act may offer an alternative approach to resolving the issues of
subsurface trespass resulting from CCS. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 3.
172. Neither a remainderman nor owners of incorporeal rights can bring an
action for trespass quare clausum fregit. See Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza
Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Tex. 2008) (citing Slye v. Guerdrum, 29
App. D.C. 550 (1907)) (“It is, of course, axiomatic that at common law the
gist of the action of trespass quare clausum fregit is injury to the possession,
and that, generally speaking, the plaintiff must show actual or constructive
possession at the time of the trespass.”).
173. Courts differ on whether drainage resulting from the transboundary
migration of fracturing fluids is an actual damage or is protected by the
rule of capture. Contrast Coastal Oil & Gas Corp., 268 S.W.3d at 11
(declining to find an actionable trespass based on a holding that the only
damages alleged, drainage, was protected by the rule of capture), with ANR
Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 893 P.2d 698 (Wyo. 1995), and Stone v.
Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, No. 5:12-CV-102, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
71121 (N.D. W. Va. Apr. 20, 2013), order vacated by 2013 WL 7863861
(N.D. W. Va. July 30, 2013) (analogizing drainage caused by hydraulic
fracturing to theft).
174. Smith v. Kansas Gas Serv. Co., 169 P.3d 1052, 1054 (Kan. 2007); Berenger
v. 261 W. LLC, 940 N.Y.S.2d 4, 2012 N.Y. slip op. 00738 (N.Y. App. Div.
2012) (Unlike trespass, which arises from the exclusiveness of possession
and requires a physical entry onto property, a claim of private nuisance arises
from an interest in the use and enjoyment of property.).
175. Sprankling, supra note 103, at 1035-36.
176. Chance, 670 N.E.2d at 992.
177. Id.
178. Sunoco Partners Mktg. & Terminals LP v. Environmental Prot. Agency,
No. 05-7472, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2817 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 20, 2006)
(denying an injunction to bar the expansion of the defendant’s injection
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facto” system of allocating deep subsurface property rights
without regard to surface property boundaries based on
“first-in-time exploitative use.”179 Yet, like the unfettered
rule of capture, an application of this system and its variants in the subsurface create significant problems: limiting
the marketability of property, encouraging waste, and discouraging investment in new technologies.180
These challenges are glaringly apparent when applied to
subsurface trespasses in non-mineral pore space resulting
from operations for CCS. Unlike mineral interests, pore
space use for CCS is incompatible with a self-help remedy; whereas a mineral owner who is aggrieved by drainage
resulting from the intrusion of hydraulic fracturing fluids
under his or her property can “go and do likewise,”181 an
owner of non-hydrocarbon pore space has little reprieve.
In fact, the necessity of obtaining a CO2 supply combined
with regulatory requirements associated with permitting
of injection units make it unlikely that an owner desiring
to try and “capture” his or her share of pore space would
be able to do so.182
This creates a troubling paradox for owners of nonmineral subsurface pore space. On the one hand, they are
without a meaningful remedy if their neighbors trespass
into their subsurface property.183 Unless they have established some prior use of that subsurface, they are unlikely
to recover based on the simple fact of the intrusion and
are likewise unlikely to enjoin a neighbor’s injection or
obtain an action for ejectment.184 However, if they do
nothing, they risk that their neighbors may, at a minimum, deplete the storage capacity under their property,
or, even worse, obtain title to their non-mineral pore space
through prescription.185
Further, considering the inability of an owner of pore
space to attempt to make separate use of the pore space,
the application of the modern rule of trespass to subsurface trespasses to non-mineral pore space resulting from
operations for CCS is problematic. Assuming courts treat
of subsurface wastes, even though plaintiff planned a competing project);
Doug R. Rendleman, The Inadequate Remedy at Law Prerequisite for an
Injunction, 33 U. Fla. L. Rev. 346 (1981).
179. Sprankling, supra note 103, at 1035-36.
180. Id. Perhaps ironically, the problems associated with ambiguity related to
private claims for subsurface trespass arising from private and individual
ownership of pore space echoes the arguments that critics of common
property advance in favor of private ownership, i.e., that “uncertainty about
property rights invites conflicts and squanders resources,” see Carol Rose,
The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 711 (1986).
181. Texaco Inc. v. Industrial Comm’n of State of N.D., 448 N.W.2d 621, 625
(N.D. 1989) (citing Martin & Kramer, supra note 44) (definition of “Rule
of Capture”).
182. States that have addressed this particular issue only permit one injector per
injection unit. See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. §35-11-315 (2011) and Ky. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §353.808 (West 2011); R. Lee Gresham & Owen Anderson,
Legal and Commercial Models for Pore-Space Access and Use for Geologic CO2
Sequestration, 72 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 702 (2011).
183. See discussion supra Part III.
184. Anderson, Lord Coke, supra note 63, at 207 (“In circumstances where a
landowner or mineral owner suffers actual and substantial subsurface
damages, courts should generally limit relief to money damages and deny
injunctive relief or ejectment.”).
185. Ellis v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 609 F.2d 436 (10th Cir. 1979).
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these trespasses similarly to those involving wastewater,186
the low probability that the injured landowner will receive
an award of damages also makes it unlikely that a neighbor
will seek to obtain an easement in the owner’s subsurface
through private ordering.187 In the absence of either liability
and the corresponding risk of damages or injunctive relief
resulting from trespass, or regulation requiring contracting, an injector who can “capture” the pore space through
nonconsensual use has little incentive to contract for it.188
Further, the lack of assurance that the acquirer of property
in pore space obtains a right of exclusive possession or use
of that property promotes inefficient use of resources and
creates further restraints on alienability.189
The lack of clarity regarding rights and remedies portends to create an anticommons in the pore space.190 An
anticommons results when “multiple owners are each
endowed with the right to exclude others from a scarce
resource, and no one has an effective privilege of use.”191
Ironically, while courts have been cautious about granting
injunctions to limit pore space intrusions, the mere possibility of injunctive relief may prevent “efficient and utilitarian use of the subsurface.”192 Absent an acknowledgement
of common rights in the reservoir, no interest holder could
fully use his or her property for CCS because that use, particularly near-border use, would necessarily result in crossboundary migration and thus would interfere with use by
others in the reservoir.193 Exposure to trespass and nuisance
claims, when combined with high transaction costs and
imperfect information, are likely to result in underutilization of the resource.194

IV.

Correlative Rights in the Pore Space

The correlative rights model used in oil and gas development provides an instructive example for addressing the
challenges presented by carbon capture. By more fully
defining property interests in the pore space within the
186. Anderson, Subsurface “Trespass,” supra note 3, at 281 (“Although [CCS] can
lead to the physical migration of substances beneath neighboring property,
[it] should not give rise to actionable trespass without a showing of actual
and substantial harm other than drainage.”).
187. Nominal damages or remedies which primarily compensate the owner may
be inadequate to deter trespassers, see, Huber, supra note 137 at 100, (If the
converter/trespasser makes profits that exceed his expected liability in tort,
he should be ready to infringe on the owner’s property and pay damages.).
188. For an example of legislation requiring a threshold amount of pore space to
be under contract in order to get an injection permit, see Wyo. Stat. Ann.
§35-11-315 (2011).
189. Huber, supra note 137, at 100 (“Making goods a target of non-contractual
appropriation . . . will induce expenditures on preventative measures by the
owner, which will in turn lead an infringer to adopt more sophisticated and
expensive ways of infringement . . . .”).
190. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition
From Marx to Markets, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 621 (1998); A. Bryan Endres,
Geologic Carbon Sequestration: Balancing Efficiency Concerns and Public
Interest in Property Rights Allocations, 2011 U. Ill. L. Rev. 623 (2011).
191. Id.
192. Anderson, Subsurface “Trespass,” supra note 3, at 206-07 (“[t]he most serious
threat to efficient and utilitarian use of the subsurface is the possibility of
injunctive relief or ejectment”).
193. Hall, supra note 141, at 401 (noting that there is a stronger private-property
interest in the interior of one’s property than at the edges).
194. Endres, supra note 190, at 626.
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correlative rights framework, it is possible to resolve many
of the questions related to rights of exclusion within the
subsurface property. An acknowledgment of correlative
rights creates a limited legal privilege among owners of
a shared reservoir while concurrently protecting rights of
exclusion against those outside the reservoir community.
As such, rather than focusing on the creation or abolishment of property rights in the subsurface, the application
of correlative rights reframes interests in the CCS “storage
complex” as a form of “limited common property” wherein
possessive rights are more appropriately allocated according to principles of proportionate use and enjoyment.195 As
Professor Rose describes, this “intermediate stage” between
the commons and fully individualized property may
induce a group to preserve a resource and to “avoid dissipating time and effort—and the resources themselves—in
unproductive disputes and wasteful attempts to grab the
most.”196 While the somewhat “diffuse rights of group
members” may lead to other inefficiencies, such as investment by an individual, this form of group property may
encourage resource-wide investment and may be more efficient than a “more expensive, resource management regime
of individualized property rights.”197
By limiting boundary-related disputes between group
members, limited common property may promote private
ordering for pore space interests and reduce uncertainty
as to liabilities and entitlements, thus encouraging investment and innovation for carbon storage without diminishment of the private-property interest.198 Consequently,
the model of correlative rights provides an interesting
solution to the issue of subsurface trespass in the nonmineral subsurface.199

A.

The Challenge of Applying Exclusionary
Principles to Property Uses That Defy
Confinement

Legal entitlements have historically evolved in response to
property use that defies confinement to a specific column
of space.200 In the early days of settlement of the West,
the open range presented challenges to the notions of pri195. Rose, supra note 16, at 132.
196. Rose, supra note 14.
197. Id.
198. Although consideration of the issue goes beyond the scope of this Article,
the question of diminishment as it relates to application of correlative
rights in one substratum of the pore space raises interesting questions of
conceptual severance. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception
of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 Colum. L. Rev.
1667 (1988).
199. Importantly, I do not suggest that this model should be applied in the
cases of associated storage related from enhanced oil recovery or to address
subsurface intrusions resulting from mineral operations by either lawful
split-estate mineral owners or through unlawful trespass from mineral use
on adjoining parcels.
200. See, e.g., Clark v. Lindsay Light & Chem. Co., 89 N.E.2d 900 (Ill. 1950)
(usufructuary interest in water); Pierson v. Post, 3 Cal. R. 175, 2 Am. Dec.
264 (N.Y. 1805) (wildlife); Del Monte Min. & Milling Co. v. Last Chance
Min. & Milling Co., 171 U.S. 55 (1898) (mining); Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co.,
49 N.E. 299 (Ohio 1897) (oil and gas).
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vate property and the doctrine of trespass.201 Implicit in
the concept of the open range is an acknowledgement that
“the feasibility of protectively fencing [ ] finite crop lands
far outstrips the possibility of containing livestock when
they wander or are driven over hundreds or thousands of
miles.”202 In response, legislators adopted “fence rules” that
granted ranchers protection from liability for trespass and
damages resulting from intrusions by cattle to unenclosed
property. The privilege created by fence rules, however, is
limited: intrusions that are willful and wanton, arise via
negligence, or occur as a result of overstocking can result
in a trespass.203
The example of open range laws provides an early American model for the modification or development of property entitlements and allocations based on the realities of
custom and use.204 Like livestock on the range, injected
substances are difficult to confine within a specific subcolumn of the total space. In the subsurface, however, it is
impracticable to place a burden on the owners of property
to protect themselves from intrusions.205 Thus, the concept
of precluding trespasses from proportionate use while permitting trespass via overstocking offers a clear analog to the
issues of trespass from carbon capture in that it acknowledges a duty to limit one’s use to equitable proportionality
and to avoid harm to the shared resource.
Acknowledging the “clear trend of courts limiting the
ability of plaintiffs to recover in trespass for intrusions at
high elevation and great depths,” the majority of scholarship has concluded that the doctrine of trespass requires
modification to account for subsurface intrusions resulting
from hydraulic fracturing.206 Professor Anderson suggests
that subsurface trespasses should be treated in a manner that is similar to air traffic: where intrusions serve an
important public purpose such as mineral development,
the restatement should be revised so that intrusions are
actionable only when they cause actual and substantial
harm.207 Professor Hall similarly suggests a modification
to the law of trespass through the creation of what he calls
“a near-border exception.”208 This model would preclude
liability for unintentional and non-negligent intrusions of

201. Kate Burke, Colorado’s Fence Law: An Overview of Open Range and Fence Out
Concepts, 43 Colo. Law. 29 (2014).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 32 (citing Lazarus v. Phelps, 152 U.S. 81 (1894)).
204. For a description of medieval, English, and 19th century American cases
related to the impacts of custom and use on the emergence of property
entitlement, see Rose, supra note 180.
205. Gresham & Anderson, supra note 183, at 9-86 (citing Pierce, supra note
14; David E. Pierce, Developing a Common Law of Hydraulic Fracturing,
72 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 685, 693-95 (2011); David E. Pierce, Oil and Gas
Easements, 34 Energy & Min. L. Inst. 318, 319-21 (2012); David E.
Pierce, Minimizing the Environmental Impact of Oil and Gas Development
by Maximizing Production Conservation, 85 N.D. L. Rev. 759, 768-72
(2009)) (“[A] landowner cannot construct a fence around the boundaries
of a subsurface reservoir rock structure because each owner’s interest is
structurally connected. Indeed, a landowner cannot easily monitor the deep
subsurface for possible trespassers.”).
206. Hall, supra note 141, at 401.
207. Anderson, Lord Coke, supra note 63, at 239-40.
208. Hall, supra note 141, at 401-05.
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hydraulic fracturing fluids while preserving a trespass remedy for “interior property” intrusions.209
While either of these suggestions may work well as
applied to subsurface trespasses resulting from hydraulic
fracturing, neither presents a clear framework for subsurface trespasses resulting from CCS. Unlike fracturing
operations resulting in a single act of trespass near property lines, carbon capture involves continuing injections
over a period of years, the complete depletion of the storage
resource, and continued physical occupation of the pore
space by injected materials or by areas of increased pressurization for an extended, perhaps indefinite, period.210 In
response to these unique concerns, the majority of scholarship addressing subsurface trespasses from CCS operations
arrives at one of two conclusions: (1) eliminating or modifying private property in the deep subsurface pore space,
thus creating a public resource211; and (2) granting private
actors broad powers of eminent domain for the creation of
CCS projects as a public use.212
The correlative rights model of oil and gas presents a
third possibility that draws from the concept of an inherent publicness of CCS that is embodied in both of these
approaches.213 Professor Pierce, in his evaluation of subsurface trespasses from hydraulic fracturing, argues that
subsurface property should be characterized according to
the philosophy of shared resources and the application
of correlative rights principles.214 This philosophy offers a
response to the problems associated with subsurface intrusions resulting from CCS activities.

B.

Correlative Rights

Correlative rights are the rights of mineral owners within a
common source of supply to produce their equitable share
of the oil and gas within a shared hydrocarbon reservoir.215
Oil and gas law does not view ownership in the shared
reservoir as absolute, “but rather provides each reservoir
owner with the ability to make acceptable uses of the reser-

209. Id.
210. Possibly further complicating the continuing trespass analysis, Wyoming
has declared that an injector continues to own all substances injected for
geologic sequestration. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. §34-1-153 (2012).
211. See Sprankling, supra note 103, at 1032, 1036; Endres, supra note 190, at
646-49; Doran & Ciphor, supra note 80, at 545; Zadick, supra note 10; Will
Reisinger et al., Reconciling King Coal and Climate Change: A Regulatory
Framework for Carbon Capture and Storage, 11 Vt. J. Envtl. L. 1, 33
(2009).
212. Klass & Wilson, supra note 3, at 425. Klass and Wilson suggest using the
model of the Natural Gas Act, which would provide a federal framework
permitting eminent domain for CCS operations that presumably would
preempt state condemnation laws. At least two states have specifically
limited the availability of eminent domain for purposes related to CCS. See
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §35-11-316(j) (2015) (“No provision of W.S. 35-11-314
through 35-11-317 shall be construed to confer on any person the right of
eminent domain and no order for unitization issued under this section shall
act so as to grant to any person the right of eminent domain.”); Okla. Stat.
Ann. tit. 27A, §3-5-106 (2009) (“Nothing in this act shall grant a private
operator the right of condemnation or eminent domain for any purpose.”).
213. Gresham & Anderson, supra note 182, at 9-86.
214. Pierce, supra note 14.
215. Martin & Kramer, supra note 44 (definition of “Correlative Rights”).
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voir to extract oil and gas.”216 As Professor Pierce has noted,
correlative rights fit within the property concept of what
Professor Rose has called “Limited Common Property,”
or “property held as a commons among the members of a
group, but exclusively vis-à-vis the outside world.”217 Rather
than subscribing to compartmentalized notions of exclusive ownership, the correlative rights framework analyzes
an individual’s property interests relative to others within
the reservoir community.218 Within the reservoir, each
individual possesses “similar rights and duties, whereby
each can impact the community and the community can
impact each individual.”219 This construct thus applies a
rule of reasonable use that acknowledges that an owner’s
use of his or her property is limited by his or her obligation
to preserve for others their ability to do the same.220
Correlative rights has its genesis in two principles:
(1) the rule of capture, whereby each person in a field has
a right to produce from and capture such oil and gas as he
or she can draw into his or her well without liability for
conversion, and (2) the right of mineral owners within that
field to be protected against damage to the common source
of supply.221 The rule of capture provides that a producer of
oil has ownership of whatever fluids naturally flow into a
well lawfully bottomed below his or her property.222 Thus,
property rights are perfected via capture and each property
owner is incented to capture as much property as possible
to the extent he or she can do so without negligence or
waste.223 The rule of capture protects producers from liability for conversion of oil and gas that crosses property lines
and flows naturally into the wells of a neighboring landowner.224 Rather than permitting an owner to recover for
transboundary drainage, the remedy is one of self-help: the
owner can drill his or her own well and attempt to capture
as much of the common reservoir as the law will permit.225
The superlative of correlative rights—that each owner
within a common reservoir has a right to attempt to cap216. Pierce, supra note 14, at 244.
217. Id. at 244 (quoting Rose, supra note 16, at 132).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 245.
220. Endres, supra note 190, at 635.
221. Young v. Ethyl Corp., 521 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1975) (citing Summers, supra
note 17, §63 at 180-81:
The term correlative rights is merely a convenient method of indicating that each owner of land in a common source of supply of oil
and gas has legal privileges as against other owners of land therein
to take oil and gas therefrom by lawful operations conducted on his
own land limited, however, by duties to other owners not to injure
the source of supply and by duties not to take an undue proportion
of the oil and gas. In addition, of course, to this aggregate of legal
relations, each landowner has duties to the public not to waste the
oil and gas.
222. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (citing Northcutt Ely, The
Conservation of Oil, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1209 (1938)).
223. Breton Energy, L.L.C. v. Mariner Energy Res., Inc., 764 F.3d 394 (5th Cir.
2014).
224. SWEPI, L.P. v. Camden Res., Inc., 139 S.W.3d 322 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004);
Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex.
2008).
225. Geo Viking, Inc. v. Tex-Lee Operating Co., 817 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. Ct. App.
1991). The rule of capture can be limited by administrative action such as
unitization. See Desormeaux v. Inexco Oil Co., 277 So. 2d 218 (La. App.
3rd Cir. 1973), writ denied, 302 So. 2d 37 (La. 1974).
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ture a just and equitable share of the oil and gas within the
reservoir—could not exist without grounding in a prohibition on waste.226 The opportunity to capture a just and
equitable share of a resource is only valuable to the extent
that others in the resource are precluded from diminishing
that right.227 Thus, correlative rights in oil and gas arise
from, and are subordinate to, the concept of prohibition of
waste.228 Waste can include damage to the shared resource
through dissipation of reservoir energy but also economic
waste resulting from drilling more wells than are necessary
to efficiently produce the reservoir.229 Given the strong public interest in the efficient utilization of natural resources,
actions that render portions of the reservoir unrecoverable
harm not only the producer, but also the public and all others with like rights within the shared resource.230

C.

Correlative Rights in the Pore Space

Correlative rights can easily be applied to notions of ownership in the pore space for purposes of CCS. A migration
toward a less-exclusive view of ownership within the storage complex prevents frivolous and most likely unfruitful
litigation for trespass and allows landowners and courts
to focus instead on equity and efficiency.231 This removes
courts from the tedious and impossible task of parsing
molecules among property boundaries and instead allows a
broad equitable focus on volume.
There are, however, a few important distinctions. While
the concepts of the rule of capture and the prohibition of
waste are inseverable from the concept of correlative rights
in oil and gas, neither is directly applicable to CCS operations. Carbon capture works opposite to production: rather
than drawing down substances from the reservoir and thus
depleting the fluid resource, CCS aims to capture the pore
space through injection into it, thus depleting the reservoir’s storage capacity. Accordingly, the rule of capture as a
privilege against conversion does not apply.
Neither does the inverse—or negative—rule of capture apply.232 The negative rule of capture addresses transboundary migration of injected substances for enhanced
226. Sidney J. Strong, Application of the Doctrine of Correlative Rights by the State
Conservation Agency in the Absence of Express Statutory Authorization, 28
Mont. L. Rev. 205, 209 (1966).
227. Brown v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 83 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. 1935).
228. Mobile Exploration & Producing U.S. Inc. v. State Corp. Comm’n of State
of Kan., 258 Kan. 796 (Kan. 1995); Gilmore v. Oil & Gas Conservation
Comm’n, 642 P.2d 773 (Wyo. 1982).
229. Breton Energy, L.L.C. v. Mariner Energy Res., Inc., 764 F.3d 394, 406
(5th Cir. 2014) (citing La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §30:3(16) (2013), Owen L.
Anderson, Exploratory Unitization Under the 2004 Model Oil and Gas
Conservation Act: Leveling the Playing Field, 24 J. Land Resources &
Envt’l L. 277, 278 (2004), Nancy Saint-Paul, Summers Oil and Gas
4:10 (3d ed. 2013), and Brad Secrist, Not All “Units” Are Created Equal,
65 Okla. L. Rev. 157, 159 (2012)); 8 Patrick H. Martin & Bruce M.
Kramer, Williams & Meyers Oil & Gas Law 1133 (2015)).
230. Application of Farmers Irrigation Dist., 194 N.W.2d 788 (Neb. 1972).
231. Gresham & Anderson, supra note 182, at 9-86 (“In the GCS context,
this community approach would balance a landowner’s right to use the
subsurface with neighboring landowners’ equal and correlative opportunity
to make productive use of the rock structure held in common with others.”).
232. Chance v. BP Chems. Inc., 670 N.E.2d 985, 992 (Ohio 1996).
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oil recovery.233 However, the negative rule of capture is specific to extraction.234 The privilege it creates is based on
the fact that enhanced recovery operations are necessary to
prevent waste and increase ultimate recovery.235 Therefore,
while the injection is trespassory in character, the majority
of courts have declined to award damages for the drainage that results.236 However, as the court in Chance v. BP
Chemicals Inc. notes, where the injection “has nothing to
do with the extraction or storage of oil or gas” it is “fundamentally dissimilar” to cases where the negative rule of
capture has been applied.237
The rule of capture fits awkwardly in operations for
carbon capture in that the traditional remedy of self-help
may be inappropriate or unavailable. Unlike the potentially ubiquitous presence of oil and gas within a resource
play, CCS depends on the ability of the injector to fill the
“embodied nothing” of the pore space. The majority of oil
and gas reserves can be drained from multiple locations by
multiple independent operators within a reservoir, whereas
carbon capture operations are more likely to be centralized.
Injection for CCS requires the capture and transportation
of a defined CO2 stream from an anthropogenic source to
the injection field. Although a storage project may involve
many wells, including wells for monitoring, because the
resource is exogenous, not every owner of pore space will
have access to that resource, and therefore the ability to
“capture” the pore space via independent operations on his
or her own land is limited.
Accordingly, because the rule of capture and the remedy of self-help are only marginally applicable, correlative rights as applied in the non-hydrocarbon pore space
should attempt to be as proportionate as possible. Even
in the context of oil and gas, however, the rule of capture
is not “a license to plunder.”238 Use must be reasonable
and, to some lesser extent, proportionate.239 Proportionate
use should provide for use that is substantially in proportion to the amount that the pore space under an owner’s
property bears to the total recoverable storage complex.
Additionally, proportionality should allow for and anticipate modification as more detailed geologic and technical
information becomes available. While an application of
correlative rights acknowledges that some of those fluids
will likely migrate under the land of others, the application of these rules would assure that one landowner could
233. Railroad Comm’n of Tex. v. Manziel, 31 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1948); J. Thomas
Lane et al., Ownership and Use of Underground Space, 32 Energy & Min. L.
Found. §23.04 (2011).
234. Chance, 670 N.E.2d at 991.
235. Tidewater Oil Co. v. Jackson, 320 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1963); Crawford v.
Hrabe, 44 P.3d 442 (Kan. 2002).
236. Id.
237. Chance, 670 N.E.2d at 992.
238. Young v. Ethyl Corp., 521 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1975).
239. State conservation statutes differ in the extent to which they are to assure an
equitable distribution of the source of supply. See Martin & Kramer, supra
note 41, §204.6. Nevada, for example, defines correlative rights as affording
each owner with the opportunity to produce without waste a “just and
equitable share of the oil or gas, or both, in the pool and for this purpose to
use the owner’s just and equitable share of the reservoir’s energy.” Nev. Rev.
Stat. §522.021 (2013).
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not use the entire reservoir without the consent of, and
likely compensation to, other property owners within the
storage complex.
A rule like this would encourage private ordering by
incentivizing both coordination and self-restraint.240 Since
no one owner could use more than his equitable share
of the pore space without agreement from others within
the storage complex, would-be injectors would have the
maximum incentive to contract.241 These “scale returns”
or “instructiveness” create the maximum incentive to
contract and address the problem of underinvestment242:
cooperation would yield opportunity, turning an otherwise difficult-to-value asset with limited market value into
a usable resource with high societal benefit.243 A correlative rights model would also limit the self-interest of any
owner in the storage complex from blocking development,
thus mitigating the problem of holdouts.244 Since operations could go on without a defecting owner’s consent, and
all those cooperating would share in the benefits generated
therefrom, cooperation would be valuable.
Defection, however, would be injurious. Defectors
may have any number of reasons for objecting to the siting of climate mitigation projects under their properties,
including the opportunity cost associated with foreclosing
other uses of the pore space, apprehensions about reservoir
breach and future CO2 release or liability, concerns related
to induced seismicity, or objection to the use of CCS as a
climate mitigation technology.245 Despite these concerns,
the ability of a defecting pore space owner to separately use
his or her property will be diminished as more members of
the reservoir community engage in cooperation.246 Because
it is unlikely that two separate injectors would contract for,
240. F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, Engineering a Deal: Toward a Private
Ordering Solution to the Anticommons Problem, 48 B.C. L. Rev. 111, 115
(2007).
241. Gresham & Anderson, supra note 182, at 9-86. This is the precise reason
however that Zadick and Endres, supra notes 10 and 190, suggest public
ownership would be preferable. They posit that the expenses and transaction
costs associated with acquiring storage rights make carbon capture
uneconomic, and thus the abolition of private-property interests in the pore
space for storage would better further development of CCS projects.
242. Rose, supra note 180, at 136, 142; Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability,
122 Harv. L. Rev. 1403 (2009).
243. Id.; Burlington Res. Oil & Gas Co., LP v. Land & Sons Inc., 259 P.3d 766
(Mont. 2011) (noting that presently no market for pore space exists).
244. Gresham & Anderson, supra note 182, at 9-86 (“For example, a subsurface
owner’s desire not to use a connected subsurface structure would not
necessarily limit use by other members of Professor Pierce’s ‘reservoir
community.’ If the activity is beneficial to the ‘community’ then it can be
pursued, regardless of dissenting community members.”).
245. Gray, supra note 36, at 326 (“It would be possible for CO2 to cause saline
intrusion into potable aquifers, make sources of oil and gas unattainable,
create pressure changes within the ground, and even trigger seismic
events.”); Klass & Wilson, supra note 3, (citing Emily Rochon et al., False
Hope: Why Carbon Capture and Storage Won’t Save the Climate, Greenpeace
International (2008)); David Biello, Can Carbon Capture Technology
Be Part of the Climate Solution?, YaleEnvironment360, Sept. 8, 2014,
available at http://e360.yale.edu/features/can_carbon_capture_technology_
be_part_of_the_climate_solution (noting that CCS critics worry that it will
entrench unsustainable technologies).
246. Given the difficulties of excluding migration and the probable application
of the modern rule of trespass, however, a defecting owner may be only
marginally more disadvantaged within a correlative rights framework than
he is presently.
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transport, and obtain regulatory approval to inject nonnative CO2 into the same reservoir, a defecting owner would
likely have no market for his or her pore space outside the
cooperative venture. Further, as the reservoir as a whole
becomes pressurized, the utility of all pore space within
it for separate use (for CCS or other wastewater disposal
or gas storage) will be depleted. Thus, a correlative rights
framework should not only require proportionate use, but,
in addition to discouraging underinvestment at the outset,
should also provide a mechanism for early defectors to seek
inclusion according to equitable principles.

D.

State Rules for Carbon Capture

Like conservation laws structured around correlative rights
in oil and gas, a non-hydrocarbon application of correlative rights would benefit from state regulation to “prevent
wasteful and inefficient subsurface uses while promoting
the affirmative exercise of correlative rights to fully develop
connected subsurface rock structures.”247 Already, several
states have adopted administrative conservation and unitization rules for CCS.248 The majority of existing state statutes regulating carbon capture and pore space are consistent
with a principle of correlative rights but fall short of a clear
extension of that term to pore space owners or an acknowledgment of a “limited commons” among the community of
pore space owners in the non-mineral pore space.249
For example, Wyoming’s carbon capture legislation
provides for unitization—the combination of pore space
from multiple parcels into an injection unit—and the
modification of units to include areas to which injected
substances have migrated based on “the fair and equitable
determination of pore space storage capacity.”250 Further,
a concept of proportionality exists. Relying on what the
Wyoming Legislature termed “corresponding rights,” all
owners within the unit are entitled to share proportionately in the economic benefits generated by the sequestration activities.251 While corresponding rights edge toward
correlative principles with respect to revenue distribution,
the reservoir community is limited to the owners within
the storage unit. Thus, the concept of corresponding rights
may fall short of precluding trespass claims resulting from
migration of injected substances into extralateral parcels
or strata.
While these laws are consistent with the principles of
correlative rights in the non-mineral pore space, they do
not obviate the necessity of the clear adoption of the principles of correlative rights and limited common property.
An injector, having unitized and created a storage unit and
received a permit to inject, may still be liable for trespasses
247. Gresham & Anderson, supra note 182, at 9-86 (If the activity is beneficial
to the “community,” then it can be pursued, regardless of dissenting
community members.).
248. Id. at 9-13, tbl. 1; Miss. Code Ann. §53-11-13 (West 2013); Wyo. Stat.
Ann. §34-1-153 (2011).
249. Miss. Code Ann. §53-11-13(c) (West 2013).
250. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §34-1-153 (2011).
251. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §35-11-314 (2011). Note that what would be considered
“economic benefits” is unclear.
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resulting from the migration of substances both within
and outside of the permit boundaries. As is clear in cases
regarding wastewater disposal, the grant of an administrative permit is not a defense to a trespass, nuisance, or liability for damages.252 Professor Kramer writes:
It is an axiomatic rule of administrative law that in the
absence of an express delegation of authority by the legislature, administrative bodies lack the power to adjudicate
common law causes of action or otherwise license or permit private actions that would violate some common law
duty, be it contract, property, or tort-based.253

While a mechanism exists for the owner outside the
unit boundaries to petition for inclusion in the unit, the
availability of that relief does not preclude the owner’s
ability to sue under common-law principles of tort. Further, the challenges of administering such a program
illustrate the difficulty in demarcating boundaries for
injection units and the storage complex. While geologic
features such as faults will surely be informative in setting
some boundaries, in other cases, modeling will attempt
to predict the location of the plume and associated zone
of pressurization. Accordingly, the creation of a unit for
CCS purposes will not preclude an action by an owner
outside the unit for common-law trespass, thus necessitating precisely the type of legislative delegation that Professor Kramer contemplates.254
In order to promote CCS, state legislatures should consider integrating correlative rights language into their carbon capture and pore space statutes. The majority of state
statutes for oil and gas conservation include correlative
rights language, and, although oil and gas conservation
is not a direct analog, accordingly state legislatures have
an established model from which to draw. Further, while
the importance of doing so should not be diminished,
through careful drafting, it is possible to avoid potential
pitfalls that could unsettle well-established norms of the
relative rights and liabilities for mineral and surface owners. For example, legislatures should be intentional as to
whether, and under what conditions, if any, a declaration of correlative rights among pore space owners would
upend the dominance of the mineral estate in depleted
reservoirs, preclude suit by mineral owners for damage to
252. Fisher v. Continental Res., Inc., No. 1:13-CV-097, 2015 WL 11400124
(D.N.D. Oct. 8, 2015); Raymond v. Union Tex. Petroleum, 697 F. Supp.
270 (D. La. 1988); Railroad Comm’n v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560 (Tex.
1962); FPL Farming Ltd. v. Environmental Processing Sys., L.C., 351
S.W.3d 306 (Tex. 2011); Hartman v. Texaco Inc., 937 P.2d 979, 983 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1997); Greyhouse Leasing and Financial Corp. v. Junior City Unit,
444 F.2d 439 (10th Cir. 1971), Gulf Oil Corp. v. Hughes, 371 P.2d 81
(Okla. 1962).
253. Kramer, supra note 5, at 104. Note that in some cases, however, unitization
has been found to alter trespass rules with respect to the surface of property
within the unit. See Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Co. 488 So. 2d 995 (La.
1986); Entek GRB, LLC v. Stull Ranches, LLC, 763 F.3d 1252 (10th Cir.
2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1895 (2015).
254. Although a designation of correlative rights may nudge courts away from
finding trespass within the permitted unit, legislatures could also consider
language limiting remedies for trespass. See, e.g., 31 La. Rev. Stat. §§8-10
(1975).
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mineral reservoirs resulting from CCS operations,255 or
provide surface owners with entitlements in oil and gas
permitting or unitization proceedings.
As Professor Hall notes, the effective administration
of a correlative rights framework in the subsurface will
require complex and active administration.256 State conservation agencies are accustomed to making determinations related to proportionality of reservoirs, and are
therefore well-positioned to administer CCS programs
and to resolve disputes relating to non-mineral pore
space use. There are a multitude of boundary-related
challenges that state agencies would be tasked with
adjudicating, including the extension of the reservoir
community and the proportionate ownership within it.
Whereas surface acreage over a hydrocarbon reservoir
is often upheld as an adequate mechanism for determination of allocation formulas for pools and units, the
appropriateness of such a mechanism as applied to pore
space should be carefully evaluated.257 While state legislatures considering a correlative rights framework may
add to predictability through their definitions and the
establishment of procedures for making boundary and
proportionality determinations, it is likely that as state
agencies address concerns, the precision and clarity of
the doctrine as applied to CCS will increase.
As with any proposal that suggests property law transitions, adoption of a correlative rights framework in pore
space would likely give rise to takings challenges. An
analysis of whether a transition or clarification of property interests in pore space as correlative would give rise to
successful takings litigation, or how any such declarations
should be drafted to be resilient to takings challenges, goes
beyond the scope of this Article.258 However, as Professor
Pierce emphasizes, correlative rights do not strive to redefine property, but rather to “clarify and elaborate property entitlements.”259 The guiding principles of correlative
rights, if applied to pore space, may be dispositive to determine takings challenges.
255. Mineral owners experiencing reservoir damage as a result of CCS operations
would likely be able to demonstrate the type of substantial harm and
interference with use and enjoyment that has been required by courts in
subsurface trespass cases to necessitate either injunctive relief or damages.
See discussion supra notes 86 and 168-74.
256. Hall, supra note 141.
257. Anschutz Corp. v. Wyoming Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, 923 P.2d
751 (Wyo. 1996); Railroad Comm’n of Tex. v. Pend Oreille Oil & Gas Co.,
Inc., 817 S.W.2d 36 (Tex. 1991); Grace v. Oil Conservation Comm’n of
N.M., 531 P.2d 939 (N.M. 1975); Masonite Corp. v. State Oil & Gas Bd.,
240 So. 2d 446 (Miss. 1970).
258. For analysis on whether a “landowner has a sufficient interest in the pore
space to implicate the takings clause,” see Klass & Wilson, supra note 3,
at 409; Pierce, supra note 14, at 251-52. While it may not be entirely
dispositive, compulsory pooling and unitization rules have withstood
challenge to both regulatory taking and due process claims, see, e.g., Marrs
v. City of Oxford, 24 F.2d 541 (D. Kan. 1928), aff’d, 32 F.2d 134 (8th Cir.
1929), cert. denied, Ramsey v. City of Oxford, 280 U.S. 563, 573 (1929);
Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 77 P.2d 83 (Okla. 1938), appeal
dismissed, Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 305 U.S. 376 (1939);
Bruce M. Kramer, Compulsory Pooling and Unitization With an Emphasis on
the Statutory and Common Law of the Eastern United States, 27 Energy &
Min. L. Inst. Ch. 7, 227-29, (2007).
259. Pierce, supra note 14, at 251.
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Oil and gas conservation laws have largely withstood
takings and due process challenges due to the anti-waste
elements of those laws.260 Thus, while it may be unintuitive
to apply concepts of waste to CCS uses of pore space, there
may be considerable benefit in doing so.261 The principal
of preventing waste is core to both customary and regulatory restrictions on use of shared resources.262 Waste is
the bounding principle of the rule of capture and the basis
for conservation laws applied to oil and gas operations.263
In order to protect the correlative rights of others in the
reservoir—and the public good associated with efficient
hydrocarbon production—no owner may use his or her
private property in the reservoir in a way that makes the
reservoir materially unrecoverable, thus diminishing the
public interest and damaging the rights of others within
the reservoir community to do the same.264
The articulation of the concept of waste, at least as it has
been traditionally understood in the concept of oil and gas
conservation laws, as applied in non-mineral pore space is
more challenging.265 Except to the extent that CCS operations may be injurious to oil and gas operations, a possibility that is adequately covered under the modern rule
of trespass, neither the concepts of physical waste or the
dissipation of reservoir energy resulting in the stranding of
hydrocarbons underground, nor economic waste, are easily applied. Yet, the application of broader waste principles
in the pore space offer potential in that it may increase the
reactivity and adaptability of property frameworks in the
pore space and, through establishment of a public interest
in CCS, create resilience to takings claims.266
By establishing correlative rights as the framework for
understanding property interests in the pore space, legislatures can resolve some of the lingering ambiguities
related to subsurface trespass resulting from carbon capture activities. As legislatures move to define ownership
and entitlements within the pore space through declara260. Bruce Kramer, Basic Conservation Principles and Practices:
Historic Perspectives and Basic Definitions 1 (Rocky Mountain
Mineral Law Found. 2006).
261. Michael Pappas, Anti-Waste, 56 Ariz. L. Rev. 741, 788 (2014).
262. Rose, supra note 180, at 125 (Customary use of the medieval commons had
been hedged with restrictions that limited depletion of resources.).
263. Pierce, supra note 14, at 245 (citing Ely, supra note 223; J. Howard Marshall
& Norman L. Meyers, Legal Planning of Petroleum Production, 41 Yale L.J.
33 (1931); Howard R. Williams, Conservation of Oil and Gas, 65 Harv. L.
Rev. 1155 (1952)).
264. Id. at 249.
265. Pappas, supra note 261. Proposed legislation introduced in Montana
adopted definitions of waste as commonly understood in the oil and gas
industry, see B. No. LC2279, 65th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2017).
266. Id. at 789 (citing J. Peter Byrne, Rising Seas and Common Law Baselines: A
Comment on Regulatory Takings Discourse Concerning Climate Change, 11
Vt. J. Envtl. L. 625, 642 (2010); Michael Pappas, Energy Versus Property,
40 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 435 (2014); Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the
Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
44 Stan. L. Rev. 1433, 1447-48 (1993); Barton H. Thompson Jr., Judicial
Takings, 76 Va. L. Rev. 1449, 1449-50 (1990)).
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tions of ownership and the enactment of conservation and
unitization laws for pore space use, they have the ability to
set expectations as to the rights of proportionality that exist
between members of the reservoir community. When correlative rights can be incorporated as part of the initial declaration of pore space ownership, at least as to those strata
that are useful for operations for CCS, legislatures may
be able to proactively overcome the natural hardening of
entitlements that occurs over time. In so doing, legislatures
can promote efficient use of the pore space and encourage
investment in CCS projects.

V.

Conclusion

The issue of trespass presents a significant obstacle to the
efficient and utilitarian development of the subsurface
pore space for geologic carbon sequestration. Substances
injected as part of carbon capture operations can migrate
across property lines. These intrusions violate a property
owner’s interest in the exclusive possession of his or her
property and, based on traditional expressions of the ad
coleum doctrine, result in a trespass.
However, most courts have been wary to award damages
or injunctive relief against intangible subsurface intrusions
in the absence of actual physical damage or unreasonable
interference with a property owner’s existing or foreseeable
use of his or her property. This yields a troubling paradox:
an owner can neither use and occupy the non-mineral pore
space for carbon capture without impermissibly intruding
upon the property of a neighbor, nor is the owner assured
a remedy against trespasses against him or her. The result
diminishes private-property interests in the pore space, discourages private ordering and investment, and results in
the underutilization of property.
This Article suggests that rather than eliminating private-property interests within the deep non-mineral pore
space, these interests should be more fully defined as a
type of limited common property with a strong emphasis on proportionate use. Correlative rights create a legal
privilege among members of a subsurface reservoir community whereby each may reasonably use his or her just
and proportionate share of the reservoir without liability
for trespass resulting from migration of injected substances
across property lines. Thus, the correlative rights framework responds to the anticommons problem that threatens
to develop with respect to pore space usage in the nonhydrocarbon subsurface.
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